Is the Election Commission of India accountable for errors in electoral rolls?

By Harasankar Adhikari 

The Election Commission of India (ECI) has initiated the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls for 2025–26 in several states, presenting it as a measure to strengthen the foundations of Indian democracy. Periodic revision of electoral rolls is indeed a constitutional responsibility of the ECI, mandated under Articles 324–329 of the Constitution, and is essential for ensuring free and fair elections in a country of India’s scale and diversity.

Historically, institutions such as the Planning Commission, and later NITI Aayog, and exercises like the decennial Census have played key roles in governance and data collection. Similarly, the ECI, established in 1951, functions throughout the year with the support of state-level machinery to manage voter registration, corrections, deletions, and transfers. These processes are meant to follow established procedures involving verification at multiple levels, including booth, assembly, and district levels.

In this context, questions arise regarding the timing and scope of the current SIR exercise, particularly as comprehensive revisions in some regions were last undertaken more than two decades ago. Electoral roll revisions inevitably affect large numbers of voters, and for many, the process can involve uncertainty, documentation requirements, and time-consuming hearings. This highlights the need for clarity, transparency, and public communication to minimise inconvenience and anxiety among electors.

Voter identity cards are issued after verification by officials appointed by the ECI, such as Electoral Registration Officers (EROs), Assistant EROs, and Booth Level Officers (BLOs). When discrepancies are later identified, it is reasonable to examine whether existing verification mechanisms were adequate and whether procedural gaps contributed to errors. Strengthening verification at the initial stage of registration may help reduce the need for corrective exercises that place additional burdens on voters.

Concerns are also periodically raised about the presence of ineligible names on electoral rolls, particularly in border states. Addressing such issues requires coordinated institutional oversight rather than retrospective corrective action alone. Since electoral officials operate under the supervision of the ECI, accountability mechanisms within the system merit continuous review.

The ECI’s operational dependence on state government personnel is another structural issue often discussed. While this arrangement has enabled nationwide election management, it also raises questions about administrative capacity and oversight at the local level. Some observers suggest that dedicated block-level or sub-district monitoring mechanisms could improve supervision and consistency in electoral roll management.

Ultimately, the credibility of democratic institutions depends not only on the integrity of elections but also on public confidence in the processes leading up to them. Ensuring that electoral revisions are conducted efficiently, transparently, and with minimal disruption to voters is essential. Periodic assessment of institutional practices, alongside constructive public debate, can help strengthen the electoral system and reinforce trust in democratic governance.