The government has recently enacted the Viksit Bharat Guarantee for Rozgar and Ajeevika Mission (Gramin) Act (VB-G RAM G Act), 2025. This Act has been introduced to replace MGNREGA, which was implemented in 2005 to provide a 100-day employment guarantee to unskilled rural workers. By making major changes to the provisions of MGNREGA, the new Act seeks to end the rights-based approach to employment.
Article 41 of the Directive Principles of State Policy in the Constitution clearly states that “the State shall, within the limits of its economic capacity and development, make effective provision for securing the right to work”. MGNREGA was introduced as the statutory realisation of this constitutional directive. However, the provisions of the new Act appear to fall short of giving statutory shape to this principle. By shifting from a demand-driven legal entitlement to a centrally controlled mission, the Act rolls back this constitutional imperative and reduces the “guarantee of rozgar” to merely another scheme.
The Erosion of Universal Rights
Section 5(1) of the Act states that “the State Government shall, in such rural areas in the State as notified by the Central Government, provide to every household whose adult members volunteer to do unskilled manual work, not less than 125 days of guaranteed employment”. Although the guaranteed employment has been increased from 100 days to 125 days, this appears to be an expansion largely on paper. Past experience with MGNREGA shows that the 100-day limit often functioned as a “hard ceiling”, with most households rarely receiving the full quota of work.
Furthermore, if the Central Government does not notify a rural area, residents of that area will have no Right to Work. This provision substantially increases the discretionary power of the Union Government, effectively reducing a universally guaranteed entitlement to a scheme dependent on central approval.
Fiscal Federalism Under Threat
Section 22(2) of the VB-G RAM G Act provides that “the fund-sharing pattern between the Central Government and the State Governments shall be 90:10 for the North Eastern States, Himalayan States and Union Territories (Uttarakhand, Himachal Pradesh and Jammu and Kashmir), and 60:40 for all other States and Union Territories with legislatures”.
Earlier, the Central Government bore 100 per cent of labour wages and 75 per cent of material costs, which in practice translated into an approximately 90:10 cost-sharing arrangement. The introduction of the 60:40 clause places a substantial financial burden on States, particularly poorer and high migrant-sending States that are most dependent on rural employment. This shift is likely to aggravate rural distress, increase the Centre’s control over fund releases, and simultaneously limit its own financial responsibility.
From Demand-Driven Rights to Supply-Driven Mandates
MGNREGA followed a demand-driven approach under which workers were entitled to an unemployment allowance if work was not provided within 15 days of demand. Under the VB-G RAM G Act, however, employment generation will occur through pre-approved “Viksit Gram Panchayat Plans” integrated into block-, district-, State- and national-level infrastructure frameworks.
This structural shift is reinforced by the new funding mechanism. Section 4(5) of the Act states that “the Central Government shall determine the State-wise normative allocation for each financial year, based on objective parameters as may be prescribed by the Central Government”. Section 4(6) further provides that any expenditure incurred by a State beyond this allocation shall be borne by the State Government in a manner prescribed by the Centre.
The Act does not specify any core standards or parameters for determining these allocations, enabling the Union Government to arbitrarily decide funding levels. These allocations will, in turn, determine the number of employment days and job cards issued. By converting a legal entitlement into a budget-capped mission, the Act directly affects the Right to Livelihood, which the judiciary has interpreted as integral to the Right to Life under Article 21 of the Constitution.
Bottom-Up Planning to Top-Down Control
Schedule I, Clause 6(4) of the Act states that the “Viksit Bharat National Rural Infrastructure Stack shall guide States, Districts and Panchayati Raj Institutions in identifying priority infrastructure gaps, standardising work designs, and ensuring that public investments contribute measurably to saturation outcomes at the Gram Panchayat, Block and District levels”.
This provision, along with the Preamble’s emphasis on “saturation-driven planning” through Viksit Gram Panchayat Plans, undermines the spirit of the 73rd Constitutional Amendment. The Act restricts permissible works to four verticals—water security, core rural infrastructure, livelihood-related assets, and climate resilience. Under MGNREGA, Gram Sabhas enjoyed flexibility to plan works based on local needs. The imposition of a centralised priority framework through a “National Infrastructure Stack” erodes this autonomy and weakens Panchayats’ ability to respond to community-specific requirements.
Mandatory Blackouts
Under MGNREGA, rural residents had the right to demand work at any time of the year. Section 6(2) of the VB-G RAM G Act now mandates that States notify in advance a period aggregating to sixty days during peak agricultural seasons when no work shall be undertaken.
This legally mandated “blackout period” is likely to disproportionately affect women workers who depend on continuous wage employment. It ignores regional variations in cropping patterns and undermines labour market flexibility. Historically, MGNREGA demand naturally declined during peak agricultural seasons, as workers opted for higher-paid farm work. By enforcing a compulsory pause, the Act reduces workers’ choice and bargaining power, potentially creating a surplus of cheap labour for industrial and large-scale agricultural interests. This provision is anti-poor and raises serious democratic concerns.
Technocratic Barriers and the Digital Divide
Workers’ organisations have repeatedly highlighted exclusions caused by technologies introduced under MGNREGA, such as digital attendance through the National Mobile Monitoring System and Aadhaar-based payment systems. These mechanisms have already created significant barriers for rural workers.
The VB-G RAM G Act deepens this crisis by mandating biometric authentication, geospatial monitoring, and geo-referencing of all works. Biometric systems are particularly unreliable for manual labourers whose fingerprints are often worn due to physical work. By making such technologies compulsory, the Act turns a rights-based entitlement into a technocratic obstacle course for unskilled and digitally marginalised workers.
The VB-G RAM G Act undermines two decades of workers’ struggles and weakens their constitutional and democratic rights. The Right to Work cannot be replaced by discretionary doles. During the COVID-19 pandemic, MGNREGA served as a lifeline for migrant workers, underscoring the need to protect its uncapped, demand-driven character and decentralised design.
Had the government focused on addressing corruption within MGNREGA’s implementation, workers would have benefitted significantly while valuable rural assets were created. The Act already contained a robust social audit mechanism—a pioneering tool against corruption—that was never fully utilised. Strengthening this provision would have been a more effective reform. However, the priorities reflected in the new Act raise serious questions about the government’s commitment to workers’ welfare.
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Ratanja Yadav is a doctoral student at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, and Sandeep Pandey is Secretary General of the Socialist Party (India)
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