Punjab disaster: Water release from dams during floods turned into a calamity

By Raj Kumar Sinha* 

In India, dams are considered vital for irrigation, power generation, and flood control, but recent experiences have revealed their limitations. Heavy rainfall in Himachal Pradesh and Jammu & Kashmir forced the release of water from the Bhakra, Pong, and Ranjit Sagar dams, flooding large parts of Punjab. Mismanagement and unplanned development deepened the disaster.

India is the world’s third-largest dam-building nation, with over 6,000 completed large dams, heavily relied upon for irrigation, flood control, hydropower, drinking water, and fisheries. Studies show that dams have both reduced and triggered floods in Indian river basins. In the current and future era of climate change, their effectiveness in flood control remains doubtful. A dam can help mitigate floods in downstream areas only if operated with this purpose in mind. However, if it is filled up as soon as water is available without consideration of rainfall patterns, it can unleash avoidable disasters downstream.

This year, heavy monsoon rains in Himachal Pradesh and Jammu & Kashmir caused a surge in the upper catchments of the Ravi, Sutlej, and Beas rivers. Large volumes of water had to be released from the Ranjit Sagar, Bhakra, and Pong dams, submerging Punjab’s plains. Floodwaters wreaked havoc across Gurdaspur, Amritsar, Pathankot, Tarn Taran, Firozpur, Fazilka, Kapurthala, and other districts. An analysis of the operations of the Bhakra, Pong, and Ranjit Sagar dams during August–September 2025 reveals that poor management and low hydropower generation from these dams played a major role in worsening Punjab’s flood disaster. Similar tragedies have occurred before—in 1978, 1988, and again in 2023.

According to an analysis by Himanshu Thakkar, head of the South Asia Network on Dams, Rivers and People, the Bhakra dam was already 53% full by August 1. By August 19, water levels had reached 1,666 feet, just 14 feet below the full reservoir level (FRL), making the dam 80% full. By the evening of September 3, it reached 1,678.45 feet (93% full). The Pong dam had crossed 60% by August 1 and 85% by August 18. Its gates could have been opened by August 3 when levels crossed 1,365 feet, but this was delayed. Eventually, by August 26, the level crossed 1,393 feet—above the FRL of 1,390 feet—forcing the release of over 100,000 cusecs of water from August 29, triggering devastating floods in Himachal and Punjab.

Thus, while Punjab was already experiencing heavy rainfall, the Pong dam’s release worsened the flooding. The situation remains critical, with the death toll rising to 43, 1,948 villages submerged, and 384,000 people affected. Of these, 21,929 people have been evacuated, while crops across 172,000 hectares (432,000 acres) have been destroyed. The Punjab Reorganisation Act of 1966, through sections 78 and 79, allocates water to non-riparian states like Haryana and Rajasthan, keeping the Bhakra and Pong dams filled even before monsoon rains arrive, making them harder to manage when extreme rainfall occurs.

Punjab’s irrigation minister admitted on August 24, regarding Ranjit Sagar dam’s operations: “What happened was completely unexpected. Nobody imagined it would turn out this way. All assessments failed. Along with rivers in Himachal, water was also flowing in from Pathankot. So even if less water was released from the dam, downstream areas would still have been submerged. Moreover, if the dam is threatened, water has to be released. The dam cannot be put at risk.”

This is a clear admission that the Punjab government did not account for the rainfall in Himachal Pradesh and Pathankot, which forced sudden gate openings on August 27, leading to the flood disaster. The technical committee—including the Central Water Commission and representatives from Punjab, Haryana, Rajasthan, and Himachal Pradesh (sometimes joined by the IMD and Punjab Agriculture Department)—was collectively responsible for decisions on water releases from Bhakra and Pong, and therefore accountable for their mismanagement.

The Indian monsoon is erratic and unpredictable, making dam management extremely difficult. Wrong estimates increase the risk of flooding. When reservoirs are nearly full at the start of monsoon, they lack capacity to absorb heavy rains, forcing large emergency releases that worsen floods downstream. Multiple dams in the same river system, such as Sutlej–Beas–Ravi, require strong coordination, which is often absent. Where gates are opened too late or water is hoarded for power and irrigation, downstream settlements bear the brunt. The destruction of life and property shows how costly dams have become. According to the Asian Development Bank, floods cause the most damage among natural disasters in India, accounting for 50% of all disaster-related losses. Today, floods are no longer just a natural disaster but a human-made tragedy.

The primary cause of Punjab’s sudden floods lies in unplanned economic development across Himachal and Punjab. Rapid growth, pursued in the name of progress, has led to reckless deforestation in hills and plains, large dam construction across rivers, encroachment on riverbeds, seasonal streams, drainage channels, ponds, and other water bodies, and negligence in maintaining water resources. All these factors have amplified the present crisis, highlighting the urgent need for sustainable development and environmental protection. The 2025 Punjab floods have clearly shown that large dams, often promoted as “flood control” solutions, have in reality failed to serve this role.

---

*Bargi Dam Displaced and Affected Association