Why Dhaka remains cautious about the BJP’s rise in eastern India

By Nava Thakuria 

The recent electoral victories of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and its allies in the eastern Indian States of West Bengal and Assam have drawn varied responses in Bangladesh. For many observers in Dhaka, the outcome represents not only a regional political shift in India but also a development with possible implications for India-Bangladesh relations, border management, migration debates, and regional security.

The BJP first came to power at the national level in 2014 and expanded its influence in northeastern India after winning the Assam assembly elections in 2016. Over time, most northeastern States, with the exception of Mizoram, came under governments aligned with or supported by the BJP. However, West Bengal remained outside the party’s control under the leadership of Mamata Banerjee and the Trinamool Congress since 2011.

Banerjee had positioned herself as one of the BJP’s prominent political opponents and frequently disagreed with the Union government on several policy matters. Differences emerged over issues such as border fencing along the India-Bangladesh frontier and the implementation of some centrally sponsored welfare schemes, including Ayushman Bharat, Beti Bachao Beti Padhao, Pradhan Mantri Jan Arogya Yojana, Ujjwala Yojana, and others.

The BJP’s strong performance in the Bengal assembly election, along with its continued dominance in Assam, has been interpreted by some analysts as a consolidation of the party’s influence across eastern India. In Assam, Chief Minister Himanta Biswa Sarma has continued to emphasize issues related to undocumented migration and the protection of indigenous communities. In West Bengal, the new leadership has indicated that border infrastructure and security may receive greater administrative attention.

These developments have generated concern among sections of Bangladeshi civil society and political groups, particularly those apprehensive about the impact of nationalist politics and anti-immigration rhetoric on Muslims in the border region. Some commentators in Bangladesh have expressed fears that political narratives targeting undocumented migration could contribute to communal tensions. Media reports in Bangladesh have also highlighted allegations concerning deportations and cross-border pushbacks, especially from Assam, though such claims remain politically contested.

At the same time, reactions within Bangladesh’s political establishment have not been uniform. Leaders of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), which returned to power following the February 2026 parliamentary elections, stated that they expect bilateral relations with India to remain stable despite political changes in eastern India. Some BNP leaders also expressed hope that long-pending issues, particularly the Teesta river water-sharing agreement, could move forward under a new political configuration in West Bengal. The agreement had faced opposition during Mamata Banerjee’s tenure as chief minister.

Former Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina also reportedly congratulated the BJP leadership following the election results. Hasina, who left Bangladesh after the political unrest of 2024, continues to remain a significant figure in Bangladeshi politics despite ongoing legal and political controversies surrounding her tenure. Her supporters argue that political conditions in Bangladesh may eventually allow her return, while critics point to the serious allegations and legal cases she faces.

The political developments in eastern India therefore carry significance beyond electoral arithmetic. For Bangladesh, they intersect with concerns about border management, migration, minority rights, regional diplomacy, and water-sharing arrangements. While official relations between New Delhi and Dhaka are likely to continue through established diplomatic channels, political changes on either side of the border are closely watched because of their potential social and strategic implications for the wider region.