India’s energy security and the Hormuz gamble: Iran war’s hidden casualty

By Hassan El Biali* 

When the United States and Israel launched Operation Epic Fury against Iran on 28 February 2026, the immediate destruction was impossible to ignore. Nuclear facilities were struck, air defence systems dismantled, and diplomatic conventions pushed aside in favour of military escalation. Yet beyond the visible devastation lay another casualty whose consequences may endure far longer: India’s energy security. As the Strait of Hormuz moved to the centre of a widening regional conflict, New Delhi’s much-invoked doctrine of “strategic autonomy” appeared increasingly less like independent statecraft and more like calculated hesitation.

India’s vulnerability in such a crisis is neither theoretical nor marginal. As the world’s third-largest oil importer, the country depends heavily on energy flows through the Strait of Hormuz. Around 40 percent of its crude oil imports and more than half of its liquefied natural gas supplies transit the narrow maritime corridor. When Iran responded to the bombardment of its territory by closing the strait, the implications for India were immediate. This was not merely a geopolitical confrontation unfolding in distant waters; it was a direct threat to India’s economic stability, industrial output, inflation management and household energy access.

The Indian government’s public response to the conflict was marked largely by silence. New Delhi avoided direct criticism of the military campaign, abstained on international resolutions urging restraint, and refrained from advancing any visible diplomatic initiative of its own. Reports suggested that Indian officials quietly urged de-escalation through private channels, yet the absence of a clear public position conveyed a broader reluctance to risk friction with either Washington or key Gulf partners such as Riyadh.

That caution came with consequences. As tensions intensified in March 2026 and the Hormuz route became increasingly uncertain, Indian refiners rushed to secure alternative supplies at sharply higher prices. Brent crude reportedly surged from around $80 to $120 per barrel within a week. Domestic prices for cooking fuel rose rapidly, LPG shortages triggered protests in several regions, and the rupee came under renewed pressure. Since nearly 90 percent of India’s LPG imports pass through the strait, the disruption exposed how dependent the country remains on a single geopolitical chokepoint. Far from insulating India from the crisis, diplomatic restraint merely left it exposed to the fallout without influence over the course of events.

For years, Indian policymakers have promoted diversification as the answer to Gulf dependency. The strategy has included increased imports of Russian crude, expanded LNG contracts with the United States, investment in renewable energy, and the creation of strategic petroleum reserves. Yet the Hormuz crisis highlighted the limits of that approach. Russian oil has undoubtedly helped India cushion supply shocks, with imports reaching nearly two million barrels per day by April 2026, but dependence on Russian shipments introduces other uncertainties, including sanctions risks, insurance complications and shipping vulnerabilities. American LNG agreements, meanwhile, are structured around long-term contracts and offer little protection against sudden price spikes during geopolitical emergencies.

India’s strategic petroleum reserves also proved less reassuring than official rhetoric often suggests. The reserves, with a total capacity of 5.33 million metric tonnes, are estimated to provide only around nine days of import cover when fully stocked. During the crisis, however, they were reportedly operating at roughly two-thirds capacity, reducing effective cover to closer to five days. Such reserves may offer temporary breathing space, but they do not constitute a durable shield against prolonged regional instability.

The deeper issue exposed by the conflict is the transformation of India’s idea of non-alignment. Historically, strategic autonomy under leaders such as Jawaharlal Nehru did not mean silence or passivity. It meant maintaining the independence to speak and act according to national interests rather than the preferences of competing power blocs. Non-alignment was not avoidance; it was engagement without subordination.

In the context of Operation Epic Fury, a more assertive version of strategic autonomy might have involved India publicly calling for an immediate ceasefire and using its longstanding ties with Iran to position itself as a credible diplomatic intermediary. India’s relationship with Tehran extends beyond energy trade to include strategic projects such as the Chabahar port and decades of cultural and commercial exchange. New Delhi could also have communicated clearly to Washington that military escalation in the Gulf carried serious implications for Indian national interests and, by extension, for the broader trajectory of US-India relations.

Instead, India largely observed events from the sidelines while other actors moved into the diplomatic vacuum. The eventual ceasefire brokered by Pakistan in April 2026 carried particular symbolic significance. For a government that has consistently sought to isolate Islamabad diplomatically while presenting India as the indispensable power of South Asia, Pakistan’s emergence as a mediator represented an uncomfortable reversal.

The immediate threat to shipping through Hormuz may have eased following the ceasefire, but the structural vulnerabilities revealed by the crisis remain unresolved. India continues to rely heavily on energy flows through one of the world’s most volatile waterways. The Gulf region remains vulnerable to future military escalation, while the United States has once again demonstrated its willingness to pursue unilateral strategic objectives irrespective of the economic consequences for its partners.

India now faces a choice that cannot indefinitely be postponed through abstention and ambiguity. It can attempt to build genuine diplomatic leverage in West Asia through active engagement and a more independent foreign policy posture, or it can continue to accept a position in which critical aspects of its economic security remain hostage to decisions taken in Washington, Tel Aviv and the Gulf capitals without meaningful Indian influence.

Strategic autonomy cannot merely mean balancing relationships while avoiding difficult positions. If the doctrine is to retain any substantive meaning, it must also involve the capacity to oppose actions that directly threaten national interests, even when those actions are undertaken by strategic partners. The Hormuz crisis demonstrated the costs of failing to do so. India’s energy insecurity was not created by the war alone; it was magnified by the absence of a coherent and confident diplomatic response to it.

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*Political analyst and writer