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14 February: Love, rage, and the unanswered legacy of Pulwama

By Mohd. Ziyaullah Khan* 
Every 14 February in India unfolds in sharp contrasts. Young couples exchange roses and chocolates, while groups such as Bajrang Dal patrol parks and public spaces in the name of cultural vigilance. Yet beyond the spectacle of romance and moral policing stands a far heavier memory.
On 14 February 2019, 40 CRPF personnel were killed in a suicide bombing in Pulwama, Jammu & Kashmir. Seven years later, the nation continues to debate not only what happened, but what did not happen afterward. On that day, Prime Minister Narendra Modi was on an official visit to Jim Corbett National Park; critics later questioned the optics of the visit, while supporters dismissed such concerns as political opportunism. The tragedy, however, was too grave to be reduced to optics alone. It raised enduring questions about governance, responsibility, and institutional accountability.
Due to weather-related disruptions, around 2,500 CRPF personnel were being relocated in a large convoy of roughly 70 to 78 vehicles along National Highway 44. The convoy reportedly stretched over a kilometre. At approximately 3:15 pm, a vehicle driven by Adil Ahmad Dar rammed into one of the buses carrying personnel. The explosion—allegedly involving a significant quantity of explosives—killed forty jawans. The Pakistan-based militant organisation Jaish-e-Mohammed claimed responsibility. Investigations later pointed towards operatives linked to Masood Azhar.
The tragedy was immediate and visible. The structural accountability that should follow such a tragedy remains less transparent.
One of the most debated claims came from former Jammu & Kashmir Governor Satyapal Malik, who stated that a request had been made to airlift the personnel but was not approved. The government has not publicly released detailed documentation confirming or denying the precise nature of that request, nor has it fully explained the operational reasoning. In conflict zones, airlift resources are limited and prioritised based on logistics and operational necessity. Convoy movement by road had been routine practice in the region for years. What remains unclear is whether risk assessment at that specific moment justified deviation from routine protocol. That question has never been comprehensively debated in Parliament or examined through a judicial inquiry in the public domain.
Large convoys were not unusual, particularly after weather delays caused a backlog of personnel. Movement in batches was considered a logistical norm. Authorities have maintained that standard operating procedures were followed. Yet the scale of the convoy inevitably increased vulnerability. Whether the SOPs themselves required revision in light of intelligence inputs is a matter that still invites scrutiny.
Investigations suggested that the explosives were smuggled in parts over time and assembled locally. The official position has consistently described the attack as externally sponsored, facilitated by local radicalisation and cross-border networks. Kashmir has long witnessed smuggling channels, recruitment pipelines, and hybrid militant structures. Intelligence failures can occur despite multiple alerts. However, public disclosure of how the explosive supply chain bypassed surveillance mechanisms has remained limited.
Media reports at the time indicated prior intelligence warnings about possible militant attacks. The government responded that intelligence inputs are often general in nature and not always actionable in precise operational terms. Intelligence rarely provides exact dates, targets, or methods. Nevertheless, post-incident analysis ideally examines whether communication gaps existed between agencies and field units. No comprehensive public white paper detailing such coordination has been released.
Speculation about insider involvement also surfaced. The arrest of DSP Davinder Singh in 2020, after he was found transporting militants, intensified suspicion. However, legal proceedings did not establish a direct link between him and the Pulwama attack. He was acquitted in one case due to lack of evidence and later dismissed from service. Suspicion alone cannot substitute for proof. Yet the absence of transparent clarification continues to fuel doubt.
In many democracies, catastrophic security failures sometimes lead to resignations or administrative reshuffles. In this case, no Cabinet-level resignation occurred directly linked to Pulwama. Operational reviews were reportedly conducted internally. Governments often frame terror attacks as acts of war rather than administrative lapses, shifting focus toward retaliation instead of internal accountability. Whether that approach strengthens deterrence or weakens democratic scrutiny remains a matter of political philosophy.
The attack undeniably reshaped national political discourse in 2019. Supporters argued that national unity was essential, that strong retaliation signalled deterrence, and that subsequent electoral success reflected public trust in decisive leadership. Critics countered that emotional mobilisation overshadowed institutional introspection and that media narratives amplified militaristic triumph rather than systemic review. Both perspectives continue to coexist within India’s political landscape.
Cinema later dramatised the episode, offering narratives of swift justice and strategic dominance. Film seeks emotional closure; governance operates in ambiguity—through diplomacy, deterrence, intelligence recalibration, and incremental reform. The gap between cinematic clarity and bureaucratic opacity has widened public unease.
Post-Pulwama, convoy protocols were reportedly revised. Security deployment models evolved. Surveillance mechanisms were strengthened. Cross-border operations were recalibrated. Yet sporadic attacks in subsequent years demonstrate that insurgency ecosystems are not dismantled overnight. Security reform is gradual, not theatrical.
Seven years on, the meaning of accountability remains contested. Accountability does not automatically imply criminal guilt. It can mean transparent inquiry reports, structured parliamentary debates, intelligence reform disclosures, and public documentation of lessons learned. Democracies mature when tragedies lead to structural improvements, not merely symbolic responses.
Fourteenth February will continue to carry roses and rhetoric. Cultural vigilantism will persist. Couples will celebrate. But for forty families, the day will forever signify absence. Honouring the fallen requires more than remembrance. It requires clarity without conspiracy, critique without partisanship, and reform without denial. National security is strongest not when questions are silenced, but when they are answered. When accountability fades, history risks repetition. And no number of roses, slogans, or films can substitute for truth.
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*Freelance content writer & editor based in Nagpur; co-founder, TruthScape

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