The booklet Path of Indian Revolution – Present Context, published by the Former Revolutionary Students Forum, presents an argument in favour of the strategy of protracted people’s war as the principal path for revolutionary transformation in India. It situates this position within the framework that characterises Indian society as semi-feudal and semi-colonial, and attributes exploitation to feudal, comprador bourgeois, and imperialist forces. The publication seeks to intervene politically and ideologically in debates within the revolutionary Left, particularly in the context of internal crises following surrenders and shifts in strategy by sections of leadership.
The booklet addresses the impact of ideological capitulation and organisational setbacks, and attempts to restate what its contributors describe as revolutionary clarity. It critically examines recent developments within the Maoist movement and challenges arguments that protracted people’s war has become outdated. The authors argue that state repression, counter-insurgency operations, and internal disintegration have shaped the current crisis, while maintaining that the strategic framework of people’s war remains relevant.
The publication raises several questions, including whether the legacy of Naxalbari continues to hold relevance, whether the Indian revolutionary movement needs to reassess its course in light of social changes, whether political and strategic errors contributed to recent defeats, whether left-sectarian deviations marginalised the movement, and whether alternatives to armed struggle exist for revolutionary organisations beyond surrender.
The booklet is critical of the role played by certain former leaders, particularly Venugopal and Vasudeva Rao, whom it describes as having facilitated large-scale surrenders of armed cadres and weapons. It argues that these actions demoralised the ranks and weakened the movement, and characterises such developments as having caused significant damage to the revolutionary project. The text also discusses the impact of counter-insurgency operations, including Operation Kagar, and links these to subsequent strategic retreats and calls for surrender.
Several contributors analyse these developments from different perspectives. N. Venugopal argues that revolutionary movements have historically revived after periods of setback and maintains that armed struggle should be understood as shaped by objective historical conditions rather than individual choice. He examines India’s relations of production to support the claim that semi-feudal and semi-colonial structures persist, and argues that temporary tactical withdrawals should not be conflated with strategic abandonment.
Pani focuses on the limitations of counter-insurgency operations in dismantling the movement and argues that internal fragmentation played a decisive role. He critiques arguments in favour of surrender and discusses the formation and functioning of guerrilla zones, their vulnerabilities, and their historical significance. While acknowledging shortcomings in practice and tactical errors, he maintains that the strategic perspective of establishing base areas was correct. Pani also reflects on earlier self-criticism documents, particularly from Andhra Pradesh, and stresses the relationship between revolutionary consciousness and practice. He traces the evolution of protracted people’s war in India, emphasising the combination of armed struggle with democratic and mass movements, and discusses processes of political education and cadre formation.
Pani further differentiates Indian conditions from those of China during Mao’s era, arguing against a mechanical application of Chinese revolutionary models. He situates the development of people’s war in China within its specific historical context, including the absence of a centralised modern state, and contrasts this with Indian conditions. He also notes changes in the international situation, including the disappearance of earlier geopolitical factors that shaped revolutionary strategy in the mid-twentieth century.
N. Ravi examines proposals for temporary withdrawal from armed struggle and argues that such positions often lead to permanent abandonment. He analyses the relationship between modes of production and revolutionary strategy, contesting the view that the spread of capitalist relations negates the applicability of protracted people’s war in India. Ravi outlines the crisis and stagnation within the movement and differentiates between insurrectionary and people’s war strategies. He discusses the evolution of the mass line, organisational limitations, and the delayed formation of a people’s guerrilla army in India. Ravi argues that the Indian Maoist movement did not mechanically replicate the Chinese path and examines debates on India’s political economy, imperialist influence, limits of legal struggle, and the challenges of operating under intensified state surveillance, particularly in urban areas. While identifying errors in both political and military practice, he continues to defend the strategic relevance of people’s war under Indian conditions.
Ajith challenges the argument that the principal contradiction in India has shifted away from feudalism, drawing on historical examples from China and Vietnam to argue that changes in principal contradictions do not automatically render people’s war obsolete. He discusses the persistence of semi-feudal relations in new forms, including their reproduction within economic, political, and social structures, particularly during the period of globalisation.
Vimal critically examines Venugopal’s earlier writings and political positions, focusing on the period preceding surrender. He reconstructs the sequence of events surrounding peace talks, ceasefire debates, and ideological shifts, and argues that these reflected theoretical and political inconsistencies. His analysis situates these developments within broader debates inside the Maoist movement and draws historical comparisons with other revolutionary experiences.
Overall, Path of Indian Revolution – Present Context presents a systematic defence of Maoist military strategy and offers a detailed critique of reformist and revisionist positions within the Left. It combines historical narrative with theoretical argument and reflects an effort to restate the case for protracted people’s war while acknowledging errors in practice. At the same time, the booklet devotes limited attention to examining the deeper causes behind large-scale surrenders and setbacks, including questions related to mass line, agrarian revolution, internal democracy, and the establishment of durable forms of revolutionary power.
The analysis does not extensively address earlier defeats in regions such as Karimnagar, North Telangana, Lalgarh, Gadchiroli, and Bastar, nor does it undertake a detailed self-criticism of major tactical errors in past military campaigns. As a result, while the publication contributes substantially to ongoing debates, certain structural and organisational issues remain underexplored.
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The author is a freelance journalist
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