Revisiting the Supreme Court verdict on Tamil Nadu bills: A constitutional perspective

By N.S. Venkataraman* 

On April 8, 2025, a two-judge bench of the Supreme Court of India criticized the Tamil Nadu Governor for not providing assent to ten bills passed by the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly, keeping them pending for several months. The Court went so far as to approve the bills themselves, despite the fact that the Governor had forwarded them to the President of India, who subsequently rejected some of them.

This decision by the Court has brought to the forefront questions regarding the balance of power between the judiciary and the office of the President of India. By effectively approving the bills that the President had already rejected, the judgment raises constitutional concerns and may risk creating a constitutional imbalance. It has also prompted discussions about whether the judiciary exceeded its authority by acting in a space traditionally occupied by the legislature, the executive, and ultimately the President.

Reactions to the verdict have been mixed. While some politicians have welcomed the judgment, several legal experts have expressed reservations. The broader principle often cited in the justice system is that judgments must be both legally sound and appear to be fair and comprehensive in spirit. In this context, questions are being raised about whether the Supreme Court took a sufficiently holistic view of the issue.

The bills in question pertain to the governance of state universities in Tamil Nadu, where the Governor traditionally holds the position of Chancellor. These legislative proposals aim to transfer the power to appoint Vice-Chancellors from the Governor to the state government. This effectively places the responsibility with the Chief Minister and other political appointees, removing an important buffer of independent oversight.

The role of the Governor, a nominee of the President of India, includes ensuring that universities are managed in accordance with constitutional principles and educational standards, rather than being influenced by political considerations. Universities are not administrative departments or state-run enterprises, and thus require a level of autonomy and non-partisan oversight.

There are broader concerns related to governance in India, including accusations of nepotism and corruption in states governed by political parties. In such a context, placing the control of Vice-Chancellor appointments entirely in the hands of the ruling party could lead to appointments based on political considerations rather than merit. In the past, there have been allegations of political interference in such appointments in Tamil Nadu.

Another contentious aspect is the Tamil Nadu government's opposition to including a University Grants Commission (UGC) nominee on the selection committee for Vice-Chancellors. This contradicts established procedures that include UGC representation, given that the UGC, as a central agency, provides significant funding and oversight. The inclusion of a UGC nominee ensures that appointees meet national standards and that public funds are managed responsibly.

The judiciary appears to have interpreted the Governor’s delay as obstructionism, without adequately examining the broader implications of the proposed legislative changes. The impact of approving all bills passed by a state assembly without scrutiny, particularly in areas affecting national interest and constitutional balance, has not been sufficiently addressed in the verdict.

Given the complex nature of Indian federalism, where state leaders sometimes express unwillingness to implement central laws, there is a need for checks and balances. In this instance, the President of India exercised her constitutional authority by rejecting certain bills, believing them to be against the national interest. Questioning this decision by the Supreme Court introduces further tension between constitutional institutions.

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*Trustee, Nandini Voice for the Deprived, Chennai