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Lipulekh and the collapse of trust: Nepal's opportunism, India's diplomatic failure

By Himadri Priya* 
The dispute over Lipulekh Pass is no longer merely a cartographic disagreement between India and Nepal. It has evolved into a revealing test of political sincerity, diplomatic consistency, and regional trust. From an Indian perspective, Nepal's increasingly aggressive claims over the strategically important pass appear less rooted in historical legitimacy and more driven by opportunistic nationalism and geopolitical balancing.
For decades, India and Nepal maintained an unusually open and cooperative relationship. Citizens moved freely across borders, cultural and religious ties flourished, and India consistently acted as Nepal's largest economic partner and crisis responder. Yet despite this historical goodwill, sections of Nepal's political establishment have repeatedly chosen anti-India rhetoric as a convenient domestic tool. The controversy surrounding Lipulekh is one of the clearest examples.
Nepal's claim over the Lipulekh region rests heavily on its interpretation of the 1816 Treaty of Sugauli. Kathmandu argues that the Kali River originates farther northwest, thereby placing Lipulekh within Nepalese territory. India, however, has long administered the area as part of Uttarakhand, with administrative records, security presence, and infrastructural control dating back decades. More importantly, Nepal's assertiveness over the issue intensified only after India strengthened road infrastructure connecting the pass to the Kailash Mansarovar pilgrimage route in 2020. To many in India, the timing exposed the political nature of Nepal's outrage.
The deeper concern for India is not merely the territorial claim itself, but the growing perception that Nepal's leadership has become strategically unreliable. Successive Nepalese governments have oscillated between cooperation with India and overt nationalist hostility whenever internal political instability intensifies. The Lipulekh dispute became a rallying point for leaders eager to project themselves as defenders of sovereignty while diverting attention from governance failures at home. Such tactics erode trust between two countries whose relationship historically depended on mutual sensitivity rather than rigid treaty enforcement.
India's concerns are amplified by the visible expansion of Chinese influence in Nepal. In recent years, Beijing has deepened its political, infrastructural, and strategic engagement with Kathmandu. Against that backdrop, Nepal's increasingly confrontational posture toward India appears less coincidental and more aligned with a broader geopolitical recalibration. While Nepal has every sovereign right to pursue diversified partnerships, leveraging anti-India nationalism while simultaneously benefiting from India's open-border economic ecosystem creates a contradiction that many Indians find difficult to ignore.
Yet India cannot escape criticism either. The current government's Nepal policy has often appeared reactive, overconfident, and diplomatically tone-deaf. New Delhi has repeatedly assumed that civilisational closeness alone guarantees strategic loyalty. That assumption has proven dangerously simplistic.
The deterioration in India-Nepal relations did not emerge overnight. The fallout after the 2015 Nepal constitutional crisis and the unofficial border blockade created deep resentment among ordinary Nepalese citizens. Even though India denied orchestrating the blockade, the perception took root permanently within Nepalese public discourse. Instead of systematically rebuilding trust afterward, India often relied on symbolic outreach and high-profile visits while neglecting sustained diplomatic engagement at the grassroots and institutional levels.
The current Indian government has also struggled to recognise how quickly regional politics in South Asia are changing. Smaller neighbours no longer wish to be treated merely as strategic buffers within India's security doctrine. Nepal's drift toward China should have prompted a more sophisticated and patient diplomatic response. Instead, New Delhi frequently appeared dismissive of Nepal's sensitivities until tensions escalated publicly.
The Lipulekh episode reflects this failure clearly. India inaugurated the strategic road to the pass without adequate prior diplomatic groundwork with Kathmandu, despite knowing the territorial issue remained politically sensitive in Nepal. Although India possesses strong legal and administrative arguments regarding the area, the government underestimated the symbolic consequences of appearing unilateral. The result was predictable: Nepal's political establishment seized the opportunity to inflame nationalist sentiment and redraw its official political map.
At the same time, India's domestic political climate has increasingly favoured muscular nationalism over nuanced diplomacy. Tough rhetoric may generate applause domestically, but foreign policy in South Asia requires patience, historical awareness, and political subtlety. Nepal cannot simply be pressured into alignment; nor can public outrage substitute for coherent regional strategy.
Ultimately, the Lipulekh dispute reveals failures on both sides — but not equally. Nepal's repeated attempts to internationalise and politicise a historically managed border issue have damaged confidence and reinforced perceptions of strategic opportunism. Its claims often appear driven more by short-term political calculations than by consistent historical conduct. However, India's inability to maintain durable goodwill with one of its closest neighbours represents a serious indictment of its regional diplomacy under the current government.
A confident India should have been capable of isolating fringe nationalism in Nepal through deeper engagement, economic generosity, and diplomatic maturity. Instead, New Delhi allowed mistrust to deepen while Beijing steadily expanded its influence in Kathmandu. The consequence is a bilateral relationship increasingly shaped by suspicion rather than partnership.
For two nations linked by geography, faith, history, and family ties, that may be the most damaging outcome of all.

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