The BJP-led NDA government has renamed the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA) as the Pujya Bapu Gramin Rozgar Guarantee Yojana or the Viksit Bharat Guarantee for Rozgar and Ajeevika Mission (Gramin) Act. This move has drawn opposition from economists, social activists, and opposition political parties across India.
Much of the criticism converges on one central argument: that the government is attempting to erase Mahatma Gandhi’s legacy as the Father of the Nation by removing his name from a flagship welfare programme. There are also apprehensions that this two-decade-old employment guarantee scheme may eventually be dismantled altogether, raising concerns about the future of the rural poor and marginalised.
The debate, however, has largely remained confined to nomenclature rather than substance. Questions are being raised about whether a job guarantee scheme is still relevant when, according to government estimates, poverty has declined from 16.2 per cent in 2011–12 to about 2.3–2.4 per cent in 2022–23. If poverty is indeed declining so sharply, what is the continuing need for a public employment guarantee?
Will the poor remain dependent on such schemes indefinitely? Is this programme merely a tool for sustaining a dole-centric vote bank? Can a job guarantee limited to one-third of the year genuinely strengthen work rights, dignity, and justice for the downtrodden? After nearly two decades of implementation, has MGNREGA substantially contributed to equity in a socialist democratic country?
Structurally, the programme suffers from inherent limitations. A guarantee of 100 days of work is inadequate to sustain a family of four or five members. In that sense, the scheme does not ensure meaningful livelihood security. It also raises questions about equality: does a limited employment guarantee truly reduce disparities between the poor and the rich when political equality—one person, one vote—remains constant?
The scheme’s operational weaknesses are well documented. Beneficiary selection has often been flawed, with Detailed Project Reports (DPRs) prepared without genuine need assessment, leading to wastage of public funds. Despite two decades of implementation, rural India still lacks adequate infrastructure.
In many places, work has been confined to repetitive activities such as cleaning or sweeping village roads, with little emphasis on durable assets like irrigation systems, drainage, or all-weather roads. In states such as West Bengal, DPRs have frequently been shaped by the interests of ruling party functionaries, turning the programme into a mechanism for monitoring and rewarding party supporters. Numerous job card holders already have alternative livelihoods, yet remain enrolled due to political patronage, sometimes sharing a portion of their wages with local party intermediaries.
For a developing country like India—now the world’s fifth-largest economy—a limited employment guarantee appears misaligned with its development trajectory. Literacy levels have improved, and the government has introduced skill upgradation initiatives, suggesting that long-term solutions should focus on employability rather than subsistence work. The inclusion of elderly persons and, at times, individuals below 18 years of age further underscores the mismatch between the scheme’s objectives and its execution.
The revised and renamed scheme does, however, introduce several notable changes. The number of guaranteed workdays has been increased from 100 to 125, wages have been revised upward, and DPRs are to be prepared based on need assessments conducted by the concerned central ministries. Biometric attendance aims to ensure that wages reach the rightful beneficiaries.
The amended Act prioritises infrastructure development, including water security, core rural infrastructure, livelihood-supporting assets, and works to mitigate extreme weather events. All assets created are to be aggregated into the Viksit Bharat National Rural Infrastructure Stack, ensuring coordinated national planning. Decentralised planning through Viksit Gram Panchayat Plans, integrated with national systems like PM Gati Shakti, is projected as a major reform.
Yet, serious implementation challenges remain. The funding structure—based on a 60:40 cost-sharing ratio between the Centre and states—has historically proven problematic. Many states have struggled to provide their matching share under other centrally sponsored schemes, leading to fund shortages and diluted outcomes. How the Centre intends to address this persistent issue remains unclear.
Therefore, the debate must move beyond the symbolic politics of renaming. The presence or absence of Gandhiji’s name on a scheme should not be the sole focus. What truly deserves scrutiny is whether the programme advances his ideals of equity, justice, and dignity of labour. A meaningful discussion on outcomes, efficiency, and long-term rural transformation is far more urgent than a dispute over nomenclature.
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