The Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls conducted in West Bengal in 2002 has emerged as a critical point of discussion in the context of the ongoing SIR 2025. An estimate reveals that only 55 percent of electors listed in the 2002 SIR match with those registered in 2025, indicating a substantial mismatch of 45 percent over the past two decades. While such discrepancies are not entirely unexpected given the natural demographic changes that occur over time, the magnitude of this mismatch raises serious concerns about the integrity and completeness of the 2002 SIR exercise.
The 45 percent mismatch can be attributed to several factors, including both legitimate demographic changes, gerrymandering and potentially significant procedural failures. On one hand, deletions from the electoral rolls occur naturally due to out-migration, as people move to other states in search of better opportunities, and due to deaths among the registered electorate. On the other hand, additions to the rolls happen through in-migration, as new residents settle in the state, and as young citizens attain voting age upon completing eighteen years. However, quantifying the precise contributions of each of these factors—deletion versus addition, and their specific causes—remains a complex challenge that demands careful scrutiny.
What makes this situation particularly concerning is the possibility that beyond these natural demographic transitions, a significant portion of the mismatch may have resulted from a flawed execution of the 2002 SIR. While periodic revisions of electoral rolls are essential to maintain an accurate and updated database of eligible electors, such mammoth exercises must be conducted with utmost care, transparency, and accountability to avoid creating unnecessary hardships for citizens.
The current SIR 2025 carries implications that extend far beyond mere updating of electoral rolls, which was the primary objective of earlier revisions. This time, the exercise has been linked, albeit through indirect mechanisms, with questions of citizenship, making it fundamentally different in nature. Given this elevated significance, the procedural lapses and systematic failures that characterized the 2002 SIR cannot be overlooked or dismissed. Instead, they must be carefully examined and corrected to ensure that genuine voters are not disenfranchised or subjected to unnecessary bureaucratic harassment.
Exclusion of Valid Electors
Field investigations and testimonies from affected communities reveal that during the 2002 SIR, established procedures were not properly followed in numerous instances, resulting in the exclusion of many valid electors from the rolls. A particularly shocking example comes from Borobagan village (Haddatola Kamatbari), located in Dharmapur Gram Panchayat in Manikchak Block of Malda district. This village presents a stark illustration of how the 2002 revision failed to capture the actual electorate.
In 1998, about 1,500 electors from Borobagan were registered across two polling booths—one single booth and one joint booth. This number either remained reduced a bit to around 1500 electors in 2003. However, in a surprising and unexplained development, the number of registered electors in 2002 dropped precipitously to just 826—barely half of the previous count. Such a dramatic decline cannot be explained by normal demographic change and gerrymandering alone and points to serious irregularities in the revision process.
Several interconnected factors appear to have contributed to this massive exclusion. First, the population in these areas predominantly belongs to marginalized communities with limited literacy and lower levels of awareness about administrative processes like the SIR. Second, since no elections were scheduled for that year—the assembly elections having been held in 2001 and panchayat elections scheduled for 2003—there was limited political mobilization around the electoral roll revision. The local political leaders, who typically play a crucial role in ensuring their supporters are registered, showed little interest in the process.
Third, and perhaps most troubling, is the evidence of negligence by administrative authorities responsible for conducting the revision. When questioned about why only approximately half of the eligible population appeared on the 2002 electoral rolls, the Booth Level Officer (BLO) who oversaw the process in Borobagan claimed to have performed his duties properly. He suggested that deletions might have occurred at higher administrative levels, effectively passing the responsibility upward.
The human cost of these procedural failures becomes apparent when examining individual cases. According to local BLOs familiar with the area, approximately one-fourth of the voters who were deleted from the 2002 rolls had previously held voter identity cards bearing unique electoral numbers. However, the remaining three-fourths did not possess voter cards, as having such cards was not mandatory at that time for casting their vote. This distinction has now become critical, as those even with a valid voter card were excluded from the electoral list.
Consider the case of one individual whose identity is being protected here. His ancestral history in the region is well-documented: his forefathers purchased land in 1901 from the then landlord, and this transaction was officially recorded in 1922. Over subsequent decades throughout the twentieth century, his ancestors engaged in multiple documented land transactions—buying and selling properties that are all matters of public record. He can produce evidence showing his forefather’s, father's, and mother's names on the electoral rolls from 1966 and 1971. His own voter identity card was issued in 1996, establishing his status as a recognized elector. Yet, mysteriously, his name disappeared from the 2002 SIR.
Under the new guidelines governing SIR 2025, the existence of his parents' names on electoral rolls from 1966 and 1971 is deemed insufficient proof. Instead of building upon decades of electoral records maintained by the Election Commission itself, he is now required to complete his SIR through alternative documentation. This creates an absurd situation where electoral lists painstakingly prepared and maintained by the Election Commission over many decades.
Widespread Errors in Names and Personal Details
Beyond the issue of mass exclusions, the 2002 SIR and earlier revisions were plagued by numerous errors in recording electors' names and personal details. In government identity documents, particularly those issued two decades ago, spelling mistakes and inconsistencies in names were extremely common. The root cause of this problem lies in the processes employed for preparing electoral rolls, especially the practice of outsourcing data entry work.
Multiple electors have complained that the names on documents they submitted during registration differed significantly from the names that appeared on their printed voter cards and electoral rolls. Such discrepancies arose from a systematic lack of quality control and verification mechanisms. During the preparation of electoral rolls in earlier decades, the work was primarily handled by private agencies or individual data entry operators, with a contract often without accountability. In such a scenario, the operators prioritized speed over accuracy, and there was minimal verification or accountability for errors introduced during data entry.
The consequence can be visible throughout the electoral rolls. In numerous instances, the same person's name is spelled differently on the same page of the voter list. For example, when an individual's name appears as a registered elector, it might be spelled one way, but when the same person's name appears as the guardian or parent of another elector on the same page, it is spelled differently. Such internal inconsistencies within a single document demonstrate the lack of systematic verification and quality assurance.
Beyond names, errors proliferate in other crucial details, including dates of birth, ages, and addresses in the electoral cards. These mistakes, which may have seemed minor administrative oversights at the time, now create serious obstacles for citizens trying to establish their credentials during the current SIR process. When the documentation from different sources contains inconsistent information, citizens are often placed in the impossible position of having to explain and rectify errors they did not create.
The Way Forward
Several corrective measures should be implemented.
First, since the first election following the 2002 SIR was conducted using the 2003 electoral rolls, both the 2002 and 2003 lists should be considered for the matching and mapping process in the current revision, specifically in the areas where mismatches during the matching and mapping process are very high, like the case of Borobagan. This simple step would significantly reduce the documentation burden on many electors who were unjustly excluded in 2002 but reinstated in 2003 in the state.
Second, the presence of parents' or ancestors' names on electoral rolls before 1st July 1987 should be accepted as primary documentation for establishing electoral credentials for SIR. To facilitate this, all historical electoral rolls should be freely available in the public domain, allowing citizens to trace and document their family's electoral history.
Third, a simplified mechanism must be established for correcting errors in names, dates of birth, ages, addresses, and other personal details that arose from the previous electoral rolls. A reasonable approach would be to accept a simple declaration form by the affected individuals, validated or authorized by local elected representatives such as gram panchayat members or ward councilors, who can attest to the person's identity and residence.
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*Assistant Professor, G. B. Pant Social Science Institute, University of Allahabad, Prayagraj. Views are personal
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