When the rains fail, a farming family’s first losses are not measured in tonnes of grain. They show up in smaller, quieter ways: a meal skipped, a child kept home to mind siblings while their mother searches for work, a goat sold at a distress price because there is no cash left.
This year, millions of rural households across India are being forced into exactly these choices. And the one public programme designed to soften this blow has been doing less, not more.
The meteorological reality is stark. Between June and September 2026, the India Meteorological Department recorded 759.4 mm of rain against a long-period average of 868.6 mm—a shortfall of 12.6 per cent. By mid-September, the India Drought Monitor showed 52.5 per cent of the country’s land area as dry or in drought conditions, up from 38.9 per cent just a month earlier. With the World Meteorological Organization confirming that El Niño is firmly established and expected to last through February 2027, this stress will inevitably bleed into the rabi season and the summer ahead.
States are already sounding the alarm. Maharashtra has declared drought in 265 of its 358 tehsils, Andhra Pradesh in 388 mandals, and Karnataka has identified 177 of its 240 taluks as drought-hit. Back in June, the agriculture ministry had already flagged 111 high-priority districts where less than a quarter of farmland is irrigated—the very places where a failed monsoon hits hardest.
Yet, at the precise moment this safety net should have been expanding, it shrank.
On July 1, 2026, just as the monsoon was faltering, the rural employment guarantee transitioned from MGNREGS to the new VB-Gram G framework. The resulting drop in support has been precipitous. Official figures show that in July 2026, the new framework generated just 7.67 crore person-days, compared to 15.33 crore under MGNREGS in July 2025—a collapse of nearly 50 per cent. The number of households receiving work fell by over 51 per cent. Over the July-to-September quarter, total person-days plummeted to 284 million, down from 418 million a year earlier. Average work per household dropped from 43.2 days in 2025-26 to a mere 17 days so far in 2026-27.
Economists rightly point out that part of this decline has administrative explanations: several states invoked the new law’s agricultural "pause period" in July, and Aadhaar-based biometric checks on the new platform successfully weeded out duplicate entries. These are valid reasons to read the data carefully. They are not, however, reasons to look away from the distress unfolding on the ground.
"Farmers are selling goats and sheep in distress as they have run out of cash and the VB-Gram G work is erratic," Sajal Kulkarni, who works with rainfed farmers in Marathwada and Vidarbha, recently noted. For a small farming household, livestock represents savings, insurance, and children’s nutrition rolled into one. Selling it during a drought is a catastrophic loss that takes years to rebuild.
In Rajsamand, Rajasthan, activists report that local officials were instructed not to accept work applications or issue muster rolls from mid-June onward during the administrative changeover. A worker who walks to the panchayat and is turned away does not appear in any statistic of unmet demand. That is the quietest, and most dangerous, part of this distress: work that was desperately needed but never officially recorded.
Women are bearing the brunt of this collapse. They accounted for 61.9 per cent of person-days under the scheme in 2026-27 up to late June. For many rural women, the job guarantee is the only paid work available close to home, and the only income they control directly. When that work dries up, so does a mother’s ability to buy pulses, school notebooks, or medicine. This is happening at a time when rural food inflation (6.13 per cent in August) is running higher than urban food inflation (5.6 per cent).
The employment guarantee has proven its worth in hard years before. A widely cited study by the NCAER and the University of Maryland credited the programme with driving at least a quarter of the decline in rural poverty after 2004-05. The lesson from that era is simple: in a bad year, the guarantee must expand on demand, quickly and close to home.
To course-correct, policymakers must take four practical steps immediately:
First, in every tehsil, mandal, and taluk declared drought-hit, the Centre and state governments must suspend any remaining "pause periods" and keep work open continuously through the rabi and summer months.
Second, gram panchayats must be mandated to provide dated, signed receipts for every work application. Unmet demand must become visible, making the legal guarantee truly enforceable.
Third, the work provided must be strategically chosen for drought-proofing: farm ponds, well recharge, desilting of tanks, and fodder plots. These are the exact assets that will buffer communities against the next dry year.
Fourth, the drastic drop in person-days must be independently examined. Policymakers must separate genuine administrative de-duplication from the reality of workers who were simply turned away at the gate.
El Niño will eventually pass. But what remains in its wake are the irreversible choices a family made to survive: the animals sold, the high-interest loans taken, the months a daughter missed school.
A job guarantee exists so that those choices are never forced. In a drought year, it should be the loudest programme in the village, not the quietest.
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Dr. Ankita Raj is a Professor at Amity University, India, where she teaches and researches education, sustainability, and community well-being
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