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Shared border communities caught in India-Nepal territorial debate

By Vidya Bhushan Rawat* 
Nepal is a friendly neighbour of India, and people like me have always felt deep cultural affinities with Nepal and the Himalayan societies of South Asia. We share not only borders but also histories, traditions, languages, food habits and kinship ties. 
From Uttarakhand to Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, West Bengal and Sikkim, the communities living along the Indo-Nepal border have evolved through centuries of close interaction. Bihar and eastern Uttar Pradesh share strong similarities with the Tarai or Madhesh region of Nepal. Sikkim and northern West Bengal are linked through Buddhist and Gorkha traditions. 
In Uttarakhand, districts such as Dharchula, Pithoragarh and Tanakpur have longstanding cultural and familial connections across the border. Because of this special relationship, people have historically moved freely across the frontier for trade, marriages, festivals and social interaction. To divide such deeply connected communities through political hostility would be a grave mistake.
Nepal’s Prime Minister Balendra Shah has been vocal about the Kalapani-Lipulekh area being Nepalese territory, but this is not a sudden development. His predecessor, K. P. Sharma Oli, had also taken a similar position. The Indian government, as well as many liberal commentators, have often avoided categorical statements on the issue, fearing damage to relations with Nepal, a country with which India shares deep civilisational links. Strategically too, Nepal is extremely important because it borders China. 
Yet the Kalapani-Lipulekh dispute is more a matter of differing interpretations than an entirely new territorial conflict, because historically the region has long been associated with Kali Kumaon and Pithoragarh.
Nepal bases its claim largely on the Treaty of Sugauli signed between British India and Nepal on March 4, 1816. According to Nepal’s interpretation, the River Kali forms the western boundary between Nepal and India in the Uttarakhand sector. The dispute arises from differing views regarding the source of the Kali River. India considers the stream emerging from Kalapani as the river’s source, while Nepal argues that the Kutiyangti River, which later joins the stream at Gunji, is the actual Kali.
However, in the Indian subcontinent, the naming of rivers has rarely depended on their size. Mythology and cultural memory often matter more than volume of water. At Devprayag, the Bhagirathi and Alaknanda rivers merge to form the Ganga. Although the Alaknanda carries much more water, the source of the Ganga is traditionally associated with Gaumukh, the origin of the Bhagirathi. At Prayagraj, the Yamuna is larger than the Ganga at the point of confluence, yet the combined river remains the Ganga. Similarly, at Kalsi, where the Yamuna meets the Tons River, the larger Tons does not change the river’s name. Even at Pachnada, where the Chambal is larger, the combined flow continues as the Yamuna. River nomenclature in the region has therefore historically been shaped more by mythology and tradition than by hydrology. The identification of Kalapani as the source of the Kali River appears consistently in British records and old gazetteers.
There is, however, a larger historical issue that Indian historians and political leaders rarely discuss. Indian history has too often been reduced to binaries of Hindu versus Muslim, whether by Left historians or by proponents of Hindutva. As a result, vast regions of the Himalayas remain neglected in mainstream historical narratives. Every Indian student knows about figures such as Maharana Pratap, Shivaji Maharaj, Jawaharlal Nehru, Mahatma Gandhi and Subhas Chandra Bose, but very little is taught about the histories of Uttarakhand, Himachal Pradesh, Sikkim or the northeastern states. In Leh, one sees towering statues of Shivaji Maharaj, yet there is little recognition of Zorawar Singh, who led military campaigns into Tibet.
Similarly, the great Katyuri rulers of Kumaon and Garhwal are largely absent from popular history. The Katyuris, believed to be of Khasa origin, patronised both Shaivism and Buddhism. Their kingdom flourished from around the eighth or ninth century onwards. Important regions such as Askot and Doti formed part of this broader political and cultural landscape. In 1790, the Gorkhas invaded Kumaon and annexed it. By 1804, they had also captured Garhwal and extended their influence into Sirmaur and Kangra in present-day Himachal Pradesh. Initially, the British tolerated this expansion because they hoped to cultivate Nepal as a buffer against China and Russia. But when the Gorkha campaigns continued aggressively, the British intervened militarily, eventually defeating Nepal and compelling it to sign the Treaty of Sugauli, which established the Kali River as the border between Nepal and British India in the western sector.
What is rarely discussed today is that Doti itself had historically been part of the Kumaon cultural world before its annexation by Nepal. The Gorkha rule in Uttarakhand is remembered in local memory as harsh and exploitative, though little has been written about it in mainstream Indian discourse. One reason may be that Nepal has long been viewed as a “brotherly” Hindu nation. Historians and governments often avoided discussing the excesses of a Hindu regime ruling over Hindu populations because the narrative did not fit neatly into ideological binaries. Brutality is more readily attributed to the “other,” while Nepal was often romanticised because of its Hindu identity. Many Hindutva thinkers continue to celebrate Nepal’s past as a Hindu kingdom, seeing it as a model India should have followed. In the process, however, the complex historical and cultural realities of the borderlands have been ignored.
This lack of historical understanding affects India’s diplomatic discourse as well. Whether secular or nationalist, India’s political elite has rarely engaged deeply with the history of Kumaon and the broader Himalayan region. Broadly speaking, much of the border zone historically shared a common cultural and political space.
It is true that Lipulekh, Kalapani and adjoining regions were once connected to the Doti kingdom. Today, Doti is an accepted part of Nepal, and no one disputes that reality. Yet historically, Doti and Askot were linked through the larger Katyuri sphere of influence. Askot, whose historical significance is often overlooked, lies barely 30 kilometres from Joljibi on the Indian side of the Kali River. The people across these regions share language, customs and kinship networks. Before Nepal’s expansionist campaigns in the late eighteenth century, Doti had little connection with the political core of Nepal. Its strongest social and cultural ties were with neighbouring Himalayan communities in Askot, Dharchula and Kali Kumaon.
The Lipulekh Pass itself has immense historical importance. For centuries, it served as a vital trade route between the people of Kali Kumaon and Tibet. Local communities prospered through trans-Himalayan trade long before the India-China war of 1962 led to the closure of many such routes. Lipulekh is also spiritually significant, serving as a gateway for Hindu and Buddhist pilgrims travelling to Kailash Mansarovar, one of the holiest sites for both faiths.
India and Nepal should therefore address the issue through dialogue rather than nationalist rhetoric. There is no need to manufacture a crisis where none need exist. The destinies of the people living on both sides of the border are deeply intertwined. Having travelled extensively through these regions, I have seen firsthand how people continue to interact naturally across the frontier. Apart from national identity, there is little sense of separation. Families participate in each other’s festivals, marriages and social functions. In much of Uttarakhand, the border is little more than a walking path. The relationship between communities remains warm, cooperative and interdependent.
Neither India nor Nepal should allow political posturing to damage these human ties. Any escalation would only benefit external powers eager to exploit regional tensions. The Government of India should take the initiative in engaging Nepal constructively so that unnecessary disputes do not poison a historically close relationship. Existing borders must be respected, but they must also be understood in their full historical and cultural context.
---
*Human rights defender 

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