Not a wave, but a return: Understanding Hindutva’s victory in Bengal

By Bhabani Shankar Nayak* 

The electoral victory of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in the recently concluded state election in West Bengal has surprised many. The ascendancy of Hindutva politics in Bengal is not accidental. Rather, the mandate for Hindutva politics is neither a momentary political shift nor merely a change in allegiance from the Trinamool Congress (TMC) to the BJP. The victory is not simply about the BJP’s rise in Bengal driven by money and muscle power or the momentum of its electoral juggernaut. 

Instead, the electoral outcome reveals three key factors: (i) a historic revival and consolidation of Hindu political consciousness led by Hindutva politics; (ii) the myth of a uniformly radical and progressive Bengali consciousness; and (iii) the failure of the Left to dismantle the Brahminical social order and to develop class consciousness and organisation in Bengal—factors that have contributed to the contemporary resurgence of Hindutva politics in the state.

Historically, sections of the Bengali intelligentsia provided the groundwork for Hindutva politics in Bengal. The Bengali essayist Chandranath Basu, who coined the term “Hindutva” in his work Hindur Prakrita Itihas (Real History of Hinduism) in 1892, was an early figure in this trajectory. The nativist idea of defending Hindu identity was further amplified in the work of economist U.N. Mukherji, who wrote the pamphlet Hindus: A Dying Race (1910) using colonial census reports. He argued that Bengal’s demography would come to be dominated by the Muslim population—an argument based largely on the report of the colonial Bengal census commissioner, C.J. O’Donnell. 

This colonial argument was later taken up by many Hindutva ideologues—from V.D. Savarkar, K.B. Hedgewar and M.S. Golwalkar to Syama Prasad Mukherjee—in shaping the Hindutva political project. The political leadership of the BJP, from Atal Bihari Vajpayee and L.K. Advani to Narendra Modi, has drawn on these narratives to mobilise and consolidate Hindu votes, with the aim of transforming India’s secular democracy into a Hindu Rashtra.

In reality, the Muslim population did not overtake the Hindu population, either in Bengal or in India. However, this colonial myth has continued to be invoked in Hindutva politics. This argument has remained at the forefront of Hindutva political campaigns, including in the recently concluded Bengal election. 

Drawing on colonial reports and Mukherji’s Hindus: A Dying Race, the claim of an impending Hindu decline became a rallying point and played a role in shaping the consolidation of revivalist tendencies in Bengal. In this process, the notion of a “Muslim other” was constructed and further amplified by the colonial partition of Bengal along religious lines. These arguments and this pseudo-intellectual template continue to form a core element of Hindutva politics in India today.

With colonial patronage, the Hindu Mahasabha, under the leadership of Syama Prasad Mukherjee, formed a government in Bengal in alliance with the Muslim League, which opposed and weakened the Quit India movement against British colonialism. From Bengal to the North-West Frontier Province and Sind, the Hindu Mahasabha entered into similar alliances with the Muslim League. These collaborations weakened the anti-colonial struggle for a united India and instead advanced the idea of separate Hindu and Muslim states, with the support of British colonial rulers. Hindutva politics was further amplified by the partition of India. The wounds of Partition, along with colonial narratives, continue to serve as a powerful resource for Hindutva politics in contemporary India. Sections of the Bengali upper-class intelligentsia and upper-caste political leadership were not only aligned with colonial structures but also contributed to the growth of the Hindu Mahasabha. These groups remain influential in shaping the BJP’s social base in Bengal today.

There was once a measure of hope that a radical Bengali political consciousness would halt the advance of reactionary Hindutva politics in the country. However, given the scale and spread of support for Hindutva politics in Bengal, this idea of a deeply rooted radical political culture appears more myth than reality. 

The rise of the BJP not only exposes the limits of that perception but also reflects the revival of the historical and ideological foundations of Hindutva politics in Bengal. This is not merely a momentary shift, but part of a longer historical continuum.

The radical and progressive politics inherited from anti-colonial struggles had more than three decades under successive Left Front governments to dismantle the Brahminical social order, challenge conservative Hindutva thought, and build class-based politics grounded in organisation and consciousness. Yet, the Left in Bengal fell short of transforming the deeper social, political, and ideological structures that sustain Hindutva politics. This failure has contributed to the rise of the BJP and its electoral success.

However, the recent election results also indicate a modest rise in the vote share of Left politics, and its appeal among sections of younger voters offers a degree of hope that the Hindutva juggernaut can be challenged. Such a challenge, however, would require sustained mobilisation of working people, who are most affected by economic inequality and divisive politics. 

The revival of a broad-based Left politics, aligned with democratic and progressive struggles, remains essential if Hindutva politics is to be effectively contested in Bengal and across India.

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*Academic based in UK