At a time when tensions in West Asia repeatedly escalate into open confrontation, the Iran–Israel hostility often appears puzzling at first glance. Unlike many enduring conflicts in the region, this is not a dispute rooted in shared borders or direct territorial claims. Instead, it is shaped by ideology, geopolitics, and competing visions of regional influence. Understanding why Iran positions itself so sharply against Israel requires revisiting history, geography, and the political choices that have defined their relationship over the decades.
Until 1979, Iran maintained cordial relations with Israel. It was only after the Iranian Revolution brought the Ayatollahs to power that Israel came to be viewed as an adversary. Geographically, Iran does not even share a border with Israel; the two are separated by countries including Jordan, which itself signed a peace agreement with Israel in 1994 under King Hussein. Likewise, Egypt, which does border Israel, entered into a peace agreement as early as 1979 between Anwar Sadat and Menachem Begin.
The role of the United States, particularly under Bill Clinton, was crucial in facilitating peace efforts between Israel and its Arab neighbors, although recognition through the Nobel Peace Prize did not extend to all involved. The tragic assassinations of leaders such as Yitzhak Rabin and Anwar Sadat underscore the deep divisions within their own societies over reconciliation with Israel.
Despite having no direct territorial dispute, Iran considers Israel an enemy largely on ideological grounds, positioning itself as a defender of Palestinians. In this pursuit, it has supported groups like Hamas and Hezbollah with funding and weapons—organizations that actively confront Israel. This policy is not merely strategic but also rhetorical. Former Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad notoriously questioned Israel’s right to exist and made controversial statements denying aspects of the Holocaust.
The hostility is not limited to individuals but is embedded within Iran’s political establishment, including its supreme leadership, which has consistently rejected the legitimacy of Israel as a state. This stance contrasts sharply with the trajectory of the Palestine Liberation Organization under Yasser Arafat, who accepted Israel’s existence and entered into the Oslo Accords with Yitzhak Rabin. Alongside Shimon Peres, they were jointly awarded the Nobel Peace Prize—an acknowledgment that even long-standing adversaries could find common ground.
Today, concerns about Iran’s nuclear ambitions further heighten tensions. Israel perceives Iran’s potential acquisition of nuclear weapons as an existential threat, and this fear underpins the strong backing Israel receives from the United States. The strategic closeness between the two countries often leads to the characterization of Israel as America’s “51st state,” reflecting the depth of their alliance. Whether under Donald Trump or any other American leader, support for Israel’s security remains a consistent pillar of U.S. foreign policy, particularly in the aftermath of conflicts such as the Gaza war triggered by Hamas attacks.
Iran’s posture suggests that it has assumed, unilaterally, the role of championing the Palestinian cause in the name of Islamic solidarity. Yet this claim to leadership is contested, especially when even Saudi Arabia—long considered a center of Islamic influence—has shown willingness to normalize relations with Israel, a process disrupted by major escalations like Hamas’s attacks. Iran’s association with such groups has, in effect, contributed to its own strategic isolation and escalating conflicts.
A final distinction is worth noting. In both the United States and Israel, public opposition to war is visible and vocal. The question remains whether similar dissent can be openly expressed within Iran.
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*Senior acedamic based in Ahmedabad
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