Apart from the upper-caste base of the BJP in North, East and Central India, the process of globalization along with its two complementarities such as modernization and urbanization engendered a new Dalit middle class displaying significantly different traits and aspirations compared with those of their rural brothers. They appeared less likely to support radical politics for social reform and were also less likely to identify with the identity of Dalits as an oppressed people.
Instead, this new class of Dalits sought a part in the larger Hindu identity which could alleviate their feelings of marginalization. These advantages from a healthy connection between neoliberal order and nationalism spilled over to the rural areas where rural Dalits too became less inclined towards revolutionary politics and looked for better lives for themselves within the larger umbrella of nationalism.
In Northern, Eastern and Central parts of India, the BJP and its ideological wing RSS noticed these feelings among the lower caste groups and worked towards providing more space to them by enlarging the Hindutva fold making it coterminous with the Indian nation and Indian civilizational identity.
The BJP’s successful casting of Ambedkar as a Hindu visionary and its ideological backbone RSS’s casting of local caste heroes in its political rhetoric as well as in Ramleelas along with construction of temples, creation of much needed space to perform rituals provided dignity to hitherto marginalized sections of society.
The BJP and South India
South India remained as the BJP’s vulnerable spot so far as its success in construction of national identity is concerned. The party has been unable to establish its foothold especially in two states Tamil Nadu and Kerala despite the RSS’s decades of indoctrination of Hindu/national values and social activities. However, the party has been able to gradually spread its sway in Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and Telangana.
Going by the statistics of the 2024 General Elections, the BJP won eight Lok Sabha seats compared to four in 2019 in Telangana. In Karnataka, the party won 17 seats compared to the 25 seats it had won in the 2019 election. The BJP’s alliance with the Telugu Desam Party (TDP) and the Jana Sena in Andhra Pradesh helped the party win in three out of the six seats it contested, up from zero seat in 2019.
The party, for the first time, won one Lok Sabha seat in Kerala in the latest elections. The victory from Kerala’s Thrissur constituency was significant for the party as it had never won a seat in the province before. In Tamil Nadu, the party could not win a single seat whereas the Opposition INDIA bloc won all 39 seats in the province.
People from South India do not buy into the BJP narrative about Bharatiya civilization that submerged caste identities within its ambit
The party’s lackluster performance in South India compared to other parts of India can be attributed to some challenges it confronts in its construction of national identity. The people of South India largely subscribe to the racial division between Aryans and Dravidians (original inhabitants). The people of North India are believed to be drawn from the Aryan stock who came from outside and the South Indians consider themselves Dravidians and the natives of the country.
Hence, they have resisted imposition of Hindu culture and Hindi language on them. In the past, the South Indian states’ opposition to imposition of Hindi language as the single official language partly demonstrated any party with North Indian linguistic and cultural resources with it would have insurmountable difficulties to get success in South India.
Second, the Ambedkarite revolutionary ideas have a strong hold in the Southern parts of the country unlike the North, Central and Eastern parts of India. Many people from these parts do not buy into the BJP’s narratives about Bharatiya civilization that submerged caste identities within its ambit.
Third, the provinces in the South believe that they continue to suffer from economic losses whereas they contribute more to the Indian economy. They do not get fair returns from the Central Government while North Indian states get unfairly a larger share compared to their financial contributions. Ironically, the BJP has not been able to attract many upper caste Hindus towards its version of national identity in most of these areas.
According to a Pew Research Centre’s survey, in 2019 General Elections, among Hindus, the BJP received some of its highest vote shares in the Northern (68%) and Central (65%) regions of the country, which include India’s capital, Delhi, and its most populous state, Uttar Pradesh. By comparison, 46% of Hindu voters in the East and just 19% in the South said they voted for the BJP.
---
*Lecturer in Political Science, SVM Autonomous College, Jagatsinghpur, Odisha, India
Comments