The U.S. war on drugs: Who gets pardoned and who gets killed?

By Bharat Dogra 

In recent months, President Trump has carried out numerous highly disturbing actions in the name of combating drug trafficking—including over 60 attacks on sea vessels, resulting in more than 220 deaths, issuing threats to Mexico and several other nations, and even orchestrating the kidnapping of Venezuela's president. 

These actions make it all the more striking that the same President Trump granted a pardon to Juan Orlando Hernández (JOH), the former president of Honduras, who had been convicted of involvement in trafficking over 400 tons of cocaine, as well as arms trafficking, and sentenced to 45 years in prison.

While the charges against JOH were proven in a widely publicized U.S. trial, with numerous witnesses testifying to his ties with drug cartels and extensive corruption, the allegations against those targeted in the attacks remain largely unsubstantiated and highly contentious. Several experts, citing UN data, have pointed out that Venezuela is not a center for cocaine production or processing. 

Civil liberties organizations have raised concerns that many of those attacked at sea were likely innocent fishermen. Luis Moreno Ocampo, former chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC), told the BBC that the U.S. attacks on alleged drug-smuggling vessels could be classified as crimes against humanity under international law.

It is worth recalling that the U.S.-backed military coup in Honduras, which ousted democratically elected and respected President Manuel Zelaya, took place in 2009. Only afterward were conditions created for figures like JOH to rise to power, and for drug and arms trafficking to escalate. More recently, former President Xiomara Castro, Zelaya's wife, lost the subsequent presidential election amid allegations of widespread irregularities and U.S. support for the right-wing winner. 

Will we witness more of such dirty politics with U.S. backing, as suggested by the shocking pardon of JOH and his jubilant return to Honduras, amid growing speculation that he enjoys powerful high-level support in the United States?

There is already talk of JOH re-emerging as a presidential candidate and potentially winning, given his powerful connections and resources. Since his earlier presidency was marked by the facilitation of drug and arms trafficking and serious corruption, a critical question arises: will his old criminal networks be revived?

Such double standards have repeatedly characterized U.S. responses to drug trafficking. The guilty are often spared or even rewarded, while innocents are frequently punished. The U.S. "War on Drugs" was launched over five decades ago by President Richard Nixon. As statements from Nixon's key aides reveal, the real motivation from the outset was to target young people—including hippies and Black Americans—who were at the forefront of the anti-war movement. The anti-drug drive served as a convenient pretext to go after these war opponents and, in some cases, send them to prison on inflated charges. Over time, it became clear that the war on drugs was leading to the incarceration of a vast number of people for non-violent drug offenses. 

This trend peaked during the Ronald Reagan presidency: the number of prisoners indicted for non-violent drug offenses surged from 50,000 in 1980 to 400,000 in 1997, with Black and Latino individuals disproportionately represented. In other countries involved in the U.S.-led war on drugs, the situation was often even worse. For instance, during President Duterte's tenure in the Philippines, an estimated 12,000 Filipinos—mostly from poor urban communities—died in the drug war.

Perhaps the most troubling question is whether, alongside the ongoing war on drugs—and sometimes in connection with it—U.S. government actions and those of its agencies actually contributed significantly to the increase in illegal drug production and trafficking, including opium and heroin.

During the 1980s, the U.S. government, particularly the CIA, with close involvement from the Pakistani government, conducted a massive operation to assemble fundamentalist fighters, known as mujahideen, from various countries to combat the Soviet army and the communist regime in Afghanistan. Although the U.S. and its allies spent heavily on providing weapons, far more money was needed to sustain the mujahideen and their local supporters. These enormous resources were raised through poppy cultivation and opium production. It is estimated that opium production in the region increased roughly twentyfold during this decade. 

Over time, numerous processing facilities emerged along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border to convert opium into heroin. The CIA turned a blind eye, arguing that its primary objective was to defeat the Soviet army and topple the communist regime; if drug trafficking increased in the process, it was regrettable but acceptable. This attitude soon backfired, as the region became a major supplier of heroin to both the United States and Europe.

After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, U.S. interest waned, and various warlords fought among themselves for greater power and territorial control. These warlords relied on opium and imposed arbitrary taxes on it as their easiest source of revenue. As the Taliban, aided by Pakistani authorities, mobilized to gain control of Afghanistan, opium again proved a ready source of income. Ironically, when the Taliban government began taking initial steps to curb opium cultivation, it was ousted following the U.S.-led war on terror after 9/11. 

Subsequently, as guerrilla warfare intensified against U.S. forces and U.S.-backed regimes, opium once more became the easiest funding source for insurgents. However, when a new Taliban government was installed after the withdrawal of U.S. and allied forces, it succeeded in significantly reducing opium cultivation relatively quickly—raising further questions about why the U.S.-backed regime had not achieved similar success earlier.

While various U.S. interventions have been closely associated with a dramatic rise in opium cultivation and drug trafficking in Afghanistan and Pakistan, this was not the first time U.S. foreign policy and military interventions were linked to drug trafficking. As David Ransom reported in the New Internationalist, the careers of several major barons of the "Golden Crescent"—a leading opium-producing area on the borders of Myanmar, Laos, and Thailand—began when the CIA stimulated their activities during the Vietnam War. 

Later, in the context of Nicaragua, Senator John Kerry's subcommittee on narcotics and terrorism uncovered numerous links between U.S.-backed Contra forces and drug trafficking. There was also the notorious scandal in which U.S. military officers engaged in freelance drug dealing to circumvent a congressional ban on funding for the Contras.

Investigations following the collapse of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) also revealed that the CIA used the bank to launder drug money channeled to the Contras. The Colombian drug cartel similarly used BCCI to launder its proceeds. Likewise, investigations into the collapse of Australia's Nugan Hand Bank uncovered CIA agents' involvement in drug trafficking.

William Blum, in Rogue State, documented multiple instances in which drug traffickers were given free rein if they agreed to assist the Contras. The CIA enlisted the support of a Honduran drug trafficker known as the "godfather of all criminal activities" to use his boats for Contra supplies. A former U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) officer stationed in El Salvador, Calerino Castillo, wrote that Contra planes loaded with cocaine flew north, landed at various U.S. locations—including an Air Force base in Texas—and returned with cash to finance the Contras' violent operations. 

Even more shocking is this quote from Dennis Dayle, former chief of an elite DEA enforcement unit: "In my 30-year history in the Drug Enforcement Administration and related agencies, the major targets of my investigations almost invariably turned out to be working for the CIA." (Quoted in Rogue State from a speech at Fordham University; see also Peter Dale Scott and Jonathan Marshall's Cocaine Politics: Drugs, Armies, and the CIA in Central America.) 

Thus, while the U.S. and the CIA at best tolerated and at worst facilitated drug trafficking at multiple levels and in numerous countries when it suited their purposes—under the cover of fighting a war on drugs—did U.S. policies also contribute to increased drug use in other ways, such as by making life more difficult and insecure for Black people and other minorities, especially in inner-city areas? Here, too, ample evidence suggests that involvement in drug consumption and trafficking increased when fair-wage jobs were denied and when welfare and employment programs faced severe cuts.

Another crucial question is this: after jailing several million people and killing thousands worldwide, has the five-decade-long war on drugs—with multifaceted expenditures exceeding one trillion dollars—actually led to any significant reduction in drug consumption and use? Current indications suggest that both globally and in the U.S., the use of intoxicating substances—including both illegal and legal drugs—appears to have increased. Within the U.S., about 50% of people are known to have tried drugs at least once in their lives, while approximately 13–20% of adults have used illicit drugs in the past year. 

Clearly, the war on drugs, despite its excessive violence, human rights abuses, and massive expenditure, has failed to create the social conditions in which people have less need for intoxication—conditions where individuals possess a strong ethical compass, enjoy happy and stable relationships, and are engaged in meaningful public welfare pursuits that leave them with no need, time, or inclination for substance use. These broader social concerns and reforms demand far more attention, while the tendency to victimize poor and vulnerable populations in the name of the war on drugs must be curbed.

Instead of militarizing what is essentially a social issue, a well-considered, multidimensional approach should be adopted—emphasizing social measures supported by medical and police efforts—and the entire endeavor should be grounded in cooperating with other countries as equal partners in addressing a social and medical crisis. This can only be achieved through an evidence-based approach. By contrast, the persistent tendency to apply double standards—pardoning convicted offenders like JOH while attacking innocent people—is clearly counterproductive and should be abandoned.

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The writer is Honorary Convener of the Campaign to Save Earth Now. His recent books include Protecting Earth for Children, A Day in 2071, Planet in Peril, and Man over Machine. His website is bharatdogra.in, and his YouTube channel is Bharat Dogra | Save Earth Campaign