Congress in Kashmir: Promises, power and a complicated past

By Raqif Makhdoomi* 

There is a growing perception in parts of Kashmir that a return of the Congress to power at the Centre would necessarily mean a return to political normalcy in Jammu and Kashmir. That expectation deserves to be examined against the historical record.

This is not an argument that the Congress and the BJP are identical. They are different political formations, with different ideologies, political traditions and approaches. But Kashmir's experience with successive governments in New Delhi also shows that the region's political grievances cannot be understood simply through the lens of today's party politics.

The story begins in 1947.

When tribal forces entered Jammu and Kashmir in October 1947, Maharaja Hari Singh sought military assistance from India. The Maharaja subsequently signed the Instrument of Accession, after which India accepted the accession and sent troops to defend the state. The circumstances surrounding those decisions remain deeply contested in the political narratives of India, Pakistan and Kashmir. It is therefore misleading to reduce the episode to a simple story in which one individual imposed accession as a condition for assistance.

There is, however, another important aspect of the 1947 story that deserves attention: the differing views within India's leadership about Kashmir.

Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, who was responsible for negotiating the accession of most of the princely states to India, initially did not appear to regard Kashmir as a matter on which India should necessarily insist at any cost. There is substantial historical evidence of Patel indicating that India could potentially accept Kashmir's accession to Pakistan if other territorial questions, particularly Hyderabad, were resolved satisfactorily. Nehru, by contrast, had a strong personal, political and ideological interest in Kashmir and was deeply involved in the state's affairs, including through his relationship with Sheikh Abdullah.

The distinction, however, should not be exaggerated into a simple story of Patel wanting to "give Kashmir away" while Nehru alone wanted to acquire it. The situation changed rapidly after the tribal invasion in October 1947. Once the Maharaja acceded to India and Indian troops entered the state, Kashmir became a central issue for the Indian government. Nehru subsequently took the Kashmir question to the United Nations, while India maintained that the accession was legally valid and that Pakistan was required to withdraw forces from the territory.

What happened thereafter shaped Kashmir's political history for decades. The accession was followed by war, the division of the former princely state, internationalisation of the dispute and the creation of a special constitutional relationship between Jammu and Kashmir and India.

There are also claims about the tribal invasion that deserve greater scrutiny. In particular, the suggestion that Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan—widely known as the "Frontier Gandhi"—planned the invasion is not supported by the historical account available to us. Contemporary historical accounts instead point to political and tribal actors in the North-West Frontier region, while supporters of Ghaffar Khan's movement were generally opposed to the tribal adventure.

The constitutional relationship between Jammu and Kashmir and India was subsequently given a distinctive framework through Article 370. Article 35A, meanwhile, was introduced through a Presidential Order in 1954 and was connected to the state's earlier laws governing permanent residents and their rights. It is therefore more accurate to distinguish between the Maharaja's earlier permanent-resident legislation and the later constitutional mechanism through which Article 35A was introduced.

For Kashmiris, however, constitutional provisions were never merely legal technicalities. They represented questions of political identity, autonomy and the relationship between Srinagar and New Delhi.

That relationship suffered one of its most consequential ruptures in 1953, when Sheikh Abdullah, then Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir, was dismissed and arrested. He remained imprisoned or under detention for many years before his political return in the 1970s.

The 1975 Indira-Sheikh Accord was another major turning point. It did not, as is sometimes claimed, abolish Article 370. In fact, the accord explicitly stated that Jammu and Kashmir would continue to be governed in its relationship with the Union under Article 370. At the same time, it accepted the constitutional changes that had already been extended to the state and gave Parliament additional powers in certain areas.

For many Kashmiris, the accord therefore represented not simply reconciliation but also the culmination of a long process of erosion of the state's earlier autonomy. Whether one views that process as necessary constitutional integration or as a dilution of the commitments made to Jammu and Kashmir depends heavily on one's political perspective.

That history matters when discussing the Congress today.

The Congress's record in Jammu and Kashmir includes some of the most controversial episodes in the region's democratic history. One of the clearest examples came in 1984.

Farooq Abdullah's government, elected with a substantial majority, was dismissed after a group of National Conference legislators withdrew their support. Governor Jagmohan installed G.M. Shah as Chief Minister with the support of Congress legislators. Contemporary reporting described the episode as a politically engineered change of government, while the Congress and its supporters defended the action on the grounds that Farooq Abdullah had lost his majority.

Whatever interpretation one adopts, the episode left a lasting impression on Kashmir's political consciousness: that an elected government could be vulnerable to political intervention from New Delhi.

This is an important part of the story when Congress presents itself today as a defender of democratic institutions and federalism.

The issue is not to suggest that the Congress alone bears responsibility for every failure of democracy in Jammu and Kashmir. It does not. The BJP, the National Conference, the People's Democratic Party, the Union government, state governments, security institutions and other political actors have all played roles—sometimes constructive and sometimes deeply controversial—in the region's history.

Nor should Kashmir's political history be reduced to a competition over which party has committed the greater number of wrongs.

The more important question is whether political parties have learned from those mistakes.

The same concern applies to the use of force.

Pellet-firing shotguns became a major part of crowd-control operations in Kashmir after the unrest of 2010. Their use has subsequently caused serious injuries and blindness among protesters and bystanders, and human-rights organisations have strongly criticised their use.

It is therefore legitimate to ask whether political parties that criticise the use of force by one government are equally willing to acknowledge the record of governments they previously supported.

Kashmiris have seen different governments in New Delhi use different methods to manage political dissent. They have seen arrests, restrictions, security operations, political bargaining, dismissals of elected governments and interventions by governors. The names and political slogans have changed, but the central question has remained remarkably consistent: how much political space is New Delhi prepared to give Kashmir?

That is why the argument that "everything will be fixed if Congress returns to power" deserves caution.

A change of government in Delhi may change policies. It may create opportunities for dialogue. It may also create space for a different political approach to Jammu and Kashmir. But history does not justify the assumption that Congress is automatically the answer to Kashmir's political problems.

At the same time, saying that Congress and BJP are "the same" would be an oversimplification. Their political philosophies, institutional approaches and stated positions differ considerably. The point is narrower: Kashmiris have experienced centralised decision-making under different governments, and political promises made from Delhi should be judged against the historical record rather than political rhetoric.

For that reason, the debate should not be about whether Kashmiris should support Congress or BJP. It should be about what Kashmiris themselves want from any government in New Delhi: democratic accountability, meaningful representation, protection of civil liberties, respect for constitutional commitments and an honest political dialogue.

Those demands should not depend on which party happens to occupy the Prime Minister's Office.

If Congress wants to convince Kashmiris that it represents a genuine departure from the past, it cannot merely point to the actions of the BJP. It must also confront its own history in Jammu and Kashmir—openly and honestly.

And if the BJP wants its policies in Kashmir to be judged fairly, it too must be prepared to confront the criticisms arising from its own record.

Kashmiris do not need political parties to tell them what happened to them. They lived through it.

So, if we want to understand how Kashmiris view Congress, BJP or any other political party, the most useful starting point is not a party manifesto or a television debate.

It is to listen to Kashmiris themselves.

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*Law student and rights activist