Violence as business: Terrorism, counter-terrorism, and the cosmetics industry

By Bhabani Shankar Nayak 

The history of organised terrorist violence has deep roots. The Sicarii and Zealots conducted the first recorded organised campaign of political violence against Roman occupation of Judaea during the 1st century CE. Historical accounts suggest that Roman governor Antonius Felix also used members of this group to eliminate political opponents, including Jonathan, the Jewish High Priest. Contemporary analysts have noted that certain Zionist movements draw ideological inspiration from the Sicarii and Zealots, while critics argue that ongoing conflict in the Middle East serves the commercial interests of the defence industry and facilitates access to regional natural resources.

The ten Crusades between 1095 and 1291 resulted in the deaths of millions of people and were justified by Christian religious authorities as holy wars to reclaim sacred territory. These campaigns generated significant revenue for the Catholic Church through religious donations, increased taxation such as the Saladin Tithe, and control over trade routes. Historians have argued that the Crusades continued as long as they remained financially viable, ending not primarily due to humanitarian concerns but because of rising costs and growing Muslim political unity. The end of the Crusades did not end organised religious violence, as Christian missionary activity became closely intertwined with European colonialism and its systems of racial governance.

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime's University Module Series on Counter-Terrorism does not include the Crusades within its historical survey of terrorism. Critics argue that this omission reflects a Eurocentric framing that treats European history selectively. The module frames the French Revolution's Reign of Terror as a foundational moment in the history of terrorism, a characterisation that some scholars consider reductive, given the broader democratic and emancipatory achievements of that revolution. The module's primary focus on the attacks of 11 September 2001 has also drawn criticism for presenting a historically narrow account shaped by contemporary geopolitical priorities.

The same module places anticolonial movements, including Vietnam's armed resistance, within a framework of terrorist violence, and identifies socialism, communism, and nationalism as sources of terrorism. Scholars have challenged this framing as politically motivated, arguing that it obscures state-sponsored violence, including the role of European powers in initiating two world wars. The module addresses Al-Qaeda and the Taliban but does not examine the documented role of United States foreign policy in supporting these networks during the Cold War era, nor does it discuss the two-decade military engagement in Afghanistan that ultimately returned the Taliban to power. Sectarian violence carried out by the Ismaili Shia Muslim sect between the 11th and 13th centuries is historically documented, but its selective inclusion or exclusion in academic discourse raises questions about consistency in how religious violence is categorised and studied.

Counter-terrorism strategies have increasingly shaped the architecture of modern security states, which exercise a broad monopoly over legitimate and illegitimate uses of force. Like terrorism itself, counter-terrorism has become a significant commercial sector, generating substantial profit for defence contractors, surveillance technology firms, and private security companies. Critics argue that the expansion of security state powers has been used to curtail civil liberties and suppress political dissent, often disproportionately affecting marginalised communities. Religious institutions across traditions, including certain expressions of Hinduism and Buddhism, have also been examined by scholars for their role in sustaining social hierarchies and legitimising state violence. Buddhist majoritarianism in Sri Lanka and caste-based discrimination in India are frequently cited as examples of how religion and state power can reinforce systems of structural violence against minorities and dissenters.

The Korean beauty industry presents a different but related dimension of this argument. The K-beauty model, built around multi-step skincare regimens and increasingly invasive clinical procedures including laser and radiofrequency treatments, has been examined by feminist scholars as a commercialised system that profits from insecurity about appearance. Advertising in the beauty industry frequently associates physical appearance with social status, professional success, and personal worth, reinforcing normative standards that critics describe as both patriarchal and commercially exploitative. In response, South Korea has seen the growth of the tal-corset, or "escape the corset," movement, in which women publicly reject conventional beauty expectations and the consumer practices associated with them.

Across these varied contexts, a common structural argument emerges: that terrorism, counter-terrorism, religious institutions, and the beauty industry each function, in part, as profit-generating systems sustained by the manipulation of fear and desire. Whether expressed through political violence, state security apparatus, religious authority, or consumer culture, these systems have been analysed as mechanisms that concentrate economic and social power among governing elites while limiting individual autonomy. Resistance to these interlocking systems, from political movements to consumer boycotts to social campaigns such as tal-corset, represents an attempt to challenge the underlying logic that connects them.