The arrest of Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan and Wang Hongwen, commonly known as the “Gang of Four,” marked a major change in the political direction of the People’s Republic of China. Occurring shortly less than a month after the death of Mao Zedong on September 9, 1976, the arrests brought the radical phase of the Cultural Revolution to an end and initiated a transition in the balance of power within the Communist Party and the state. The 50-year-old episode was followed by a reassessment of the Cultural Revolution and, over the subsequent years, by significant changes in China’s political and economic policies.
Hua Guofeng, Premier of China and Mao's designated successor as Chairman of the Communist Party, authorised the arrests. He acted with Marshal Ye Jianying, a veteran revolutionary commander and Vice-Chairman of the Party; Li Xiannian, a Vice-Premier involved in economic affairs; and Wang Dongxing, who commanded the Central Guard Unit responsible for protecting senior Party leaders.
The operation was carried out by the Central Guard Unit during a single evening and took place without significant armed resistance. It has generally been described as a political coup within the leadership. More broadly, it represented a major shift in the balance of power within the Party and state and brought the Cultural Revolution's radical phase to a close.
Historical Roots and Background
To understand the political conflict that developed during the Cultural Revolution, it is necessary to consider Mao's analysis of the problems facing a socialist society. Mao argued that the abolition of private ownership by landlords and capitalists did not necessarily eliminate social inequality or the emergence of privileged groups. He also believed that such groups could develop within the Communist Party and state apparatus.
The Cultural Revolution, launched in 1966, was intended in part to mobilise workers, students and peasants against officials whom Mao and his supporters regarded as following a "capitalist road." Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan and Wang Hongwen became prominent representatives of this political current.
The radicals were concerned that the growth of a professional bureaucracy and emphasis on administrative and technical expertise could lead to the restoration of social distinctions associated with pre-revolutionary society. They also raised questions concerning differences between mental and manual labour, urban and rural populations, and social groups.
Zhang Chunqiao, in particular, discussed the continuing existence of what Marxists termed "bourgeois right" under socialism. This referred to inequalities that could persist during the transition from capitalism to communism, including differences in remuneration and social status.
In Shanghai, Zhang, Yao Wenyuan, Wang Hongwen, Jiang Qing and their political allies became associated with the radical wing of the Cultural Revolution. They supported greater participation by workers in the management of factories and other institutions.
One important episode was the Shanghai January Storm of 1967. During this period, workers and revolutionary activists challenged the existing municipal Party leadership and sought to establish new forms of political organisation. Some participants proposed a commune based partly on the example of the Paris Commune of 1871.
The subsequent development of the Cultural Revolution, however, did not follow this model consistently. Mao supported the creation of revolutionary committees, which combined representatives of the military, Party organisations and mass groups. These bodies remained under Party authority, and the development of mass participation was increasingly combined with institutional control from above.
Political and Organisational Problems
The Cultural Revolution produced significant political and social disruption. The persecution of Party officials, teachers, intellectuals and other groups, factional conflict, violence during the late 1960s, the disruption of education and the repeated intervention of the People's Liberation Army all affected the movement's development and public legitimacy.
The original objective of challenging bureaucratic privilege therefore became increasingly associated with political campaigns and institutional conflict. The gap between mass participation and central political direction remained an important feature of the period.
By the mid-1970s, the radical leadership exercised considerable influence over the media and cultural apparatus. It also maintained connections with sections of the Shanghai militia and other mass organisations. However, it did not control the People's Liberation Army, the principal security institutions or most of the state bureaucracy.
This organisational imbalance became particularly important after Mao's death. The radicals lacked an independent institutional base capable of resisting the senior military and Party officials who opposed them. Their political position depended to a considerable extent on Mao's authority, and his death altered the balance within the leadership.
The senior military leadership included figures such as Ye Jianying, Xu Xiangqian and Nie Rongzhen, who had played major roles in the revolutionary wars and retained considerable influence within the armed forces. Several senior officials and military commanders had experienced political criticism or marginalisation during the Cultural Revolution.
The radicals also faced difficulties in maintaining a broad and sustained mobilisation among workers and peasants. Although the Cultural Revolution had initially involved extensive mass participation, by the mid-1970s the population had experienced a decade of political campaigns and institutional disruption. Many people had become less willing to participate in further political struggles.
Consequently, the political conflict surrounding the Gang of Four increasingly took place within the Party and state leadership rather than through a nationwide mass movement. The radicals had substantial influence over ideological and cultural institutions but lacked comparable influence over the military and state administrative structures.
This organisational situation helps explain why the arrest of the four leaders could be carried out rapidly after Mao's death. There was no large-scale armed confrontation or mass mobilisation in their defence.
The removal of the Gang of Four contributed to a gradual change in China's political and economic direction. Deng Xiaoping returned to a leading position and, following the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee in December 1978, became closely associated with the policy of "reform and opening up."
The subsequent reforms included the introduction of the household responsibility system in agriculture, the establishment of special economic zones, greater use of foreign investment and the gradual transformation of the system of state employment and welfare in urban areas.
These changes represented a significant departure from many of the economic policies that had characterised the Mao period.
The Gang of Four were subsequently tried in 1980–81. The proceedings attributed substantial responsibility for the Cultural Revolution to the defendants, while the political and historical responsibility of Mao Zedong was treated differently.
The 1981 "Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party Since the Founding of the People's Republic of China" formally characterised the Cultural Revolution as a serious error while maintaining that Mao's overall contribution to the Chinese Revolution was greater than his mistakes. This interpretation became an important component of the official historical assessment of the Mao period.
Assessment of the Maoist Period
The historical assessment of the Mao period remains contested. One interpretation emphasises political repression, factional conflict, economic difficulties and the disruption caused by the Cultural Revolution. Another gives greater weight to developments such as land reform, expanded literacy, improvements in rural healthcare and changes in the social and legal position of women.
A balanced assessment therefore requires consideration of both the achievements and the costs of the period. The Cultural Revolution cannot be understood solely either as a period of political repression or as an uncomplicated attempt to deepen socialist democracy.
The experience also raises questions about the relationship between mass participation, political institutions and Party authority. The Cultural Revolution encouraged sections of the population to challenge established officials and institutions, but it did not establish a stable system through which workers and other social groups could exercise independent and continuous political power.
The events of October 1976 demonstrated the importance of institutional organisation in determining political outcomes. The Gang of Four had significant influence over ideological and cultural policy but lacked control over the military and much of the state apparatus. Once Mao was no longer present to arbitrate among competing factions, their political position deteriorated rapidly.
China subsequently entered a different phase of economic and political development. The reform period produced substantial economic growth and changes in China's position in the world economy, while also creating new forms of inequality and social differentiation. The long-term consequences of these changes remain subjects of historical and political debate.
The fall of the Gang of Four therefore marked an important transition in modern Chinese history. It ended the radical phase of the Cultural Revolution and was followed by a reorientation of China's economic and political policies.
From a Marxist perspective, the experience also raises broader questions about how socialist societies address inequality, bureaucracy, political participation and the relationship between Party institutions and mass organisations. Whatever conclusions are drawn from the Cultural Revolution, its history illustrates the difficulties involved in attempting to transform social and political institutions while maintaining political stability and effective administration.
Mao himself later assessed the Cultural Revolution as having been "70 percent correct and 30 percent wrong." He identified armed conflict and the mistreatment and persecution of Party cadres among its principal problems. This assessment formed part of the wider debate over the achievements and failures of the Cultural Revolution.
The historical significance of the period consequently lies not only in the political fate of the Gang of Four but also in the broader questions it raised about socialist political organisation, mass participation and the relationship between revolutionary change and institutional authority.
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*Freelance journalist
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