Maharashtra is facing a severe agricultural crisis. After a deficient monsoon, failing crops and mounting water stress, the drought threatens farmers, agricultural labourers, livestock and rural livelihoods. Yet alongside the struggle for water and compensation, another contest has emerged: the political battle over which constituencies make it onto the drought-relief list.
By late September 2026, the state had received around 798.2 mm of rainfall against a normal of 970.9 mm, a deficit of roughly 18 per cent. The shortfall was sharpest in Marathwada, where rainfall was 38 per cent below normal, and in Vidarbha, where it was about 23 per cent below normal at the time of assessment. The government initially declared 265 of the state's 358 talukas drought-affected. Additions in October raised the total to 304 under the government resolution, although some public announcements referred to 305.
Experts and politicians alike have issued serious warnings. But the drought has also exposed a familiar feature of Indian politics: when public money and relief become urgently necessary, leaders compete to ensure their constituencies get a share. The drought is a human tragedy. Its management is also a test of political accountability.
To understand the present crisis, we must look back at the drought of 1972–73, one of the most severe agricultural emergencies in the state's history. It exposed the vulnerability of rural households that depended on agricultural wages and seasonal work. When crops failed, landless labourers lost not only their food supply but also the income needed to buy food. Drought could turn into famine unless the state protected people's purchasing power.
Famine Prevention
Maharashtra's response became an important example of famine prevention. Economist Jean Drèze's research on the period highlights the role of public employment programmes and the public distribution system in stopping a severe production shortfall from becoming widespread famine. At the peak of the crisis in May 1973, nearly five million labourers worked on relief sites every day. Between August 1972 and July 1973, these programmes generated almost one billion person-days of employment. The wages allowed rural families to buy food even when their own farm incomes collapsed.
The Employment Guarantee Scheme, sanctioned in March 1972 and later given statutory backing by the Maharashtra Employment Guarantee Act of 1977, became a lasting part of the state's approach to rural distress. Its principle was simple: when the private economy could not provide work, the government would create it through public works. The scheme had shortcomings. Wages were often low, and the quality and usefulness of some works drew criticism. Yet the broader lesson endures: drought relief must protect people's ability to earn and buy food, not merely offer temporary aid after disaster strikes.
The experience also shaped the careers of leaders such as Sharad Pawar, who entered the Legislative Assembly from Baramati in 1967 and became a state minister in 1972. For him, the drought was part of a formative period, showing how a crisis can test administrative capacity while giving leaders a chance to establish themselves.
Political Question
Relief is necessary. Who receives it is the political question. Maharashtra has developed several mechanisms for drought, including employment programmes, check dams, fodder camps, water tankers and formal assessment procedures. The present crisis has activated the Drought Management Code, 2016, which uses prescribed indicators to assess conditions and decide which areas qualify for intervention.
After the initial declaration covering 265 talukas, the government added more areas in October. The relief measures include land-revenue concessions, crop-loan restructuring, suspension of certain loan recoveries, electricity-bill concessions, drinking-water tankers, fodder support and exam-fee exemptions for eligible students. These measures are necessary. But the selection of drought-affected areas has become controversial.
Mahabaleshwar, known for its heavy rainfall, appeared on the initial list. Meanwhile, areas represented by leaders of the ruling alliance, including Kagal, Shirdi and Dindori, were initially left out. The omissions drew complaints from political representatives and raised questions about whether the assessment captured local conditions.
There may be technical explanations. A taluka's overall rainfall does not necessarily reflect conditions in every village within it. Agricultural losses also depend on dry spells, soil moisture, crop type and the timing of rain. A relatively wet pocket can distort an average and leave a severely affected neighbouring area off the list.
That is precisely why the system needs scrutiny. If the assessment method fails to capture local realities, the government must improve it. If politically influential areas receive preferential treatment, that too must be exposed. Neither possibility should be dismissed without evidence. The central question is not whether every constituency can be included in a relief package. It is whether every genuinely affected farmer can access relief through fair, transparent and consistent criteria.
Drought creates an immediate demand for government intervention. Farmers need compensation, labourers need work, villages need drinking water and livestock owners need fodder. Public funds and administrative decisions suddenly carry enormous weight, and that creates a powerful political incentive. Legislators want their constituencies included in relief notifications. Ministers face pressure from local voters. Opposition parties demand more compensation and accuse the government of neglect. Leaders within the ruling alliance challenge decisions that leave their own areas out.
Scramble For Inclusion
The result can be a scramble for inclusion rather than a collective effort to improve drought management. The problem is not that politicians demand relief for their constituents; that is part of their job. The problem arises when political influence matters more than measurable distress. A drought notification can unlock assistance, but it does not mean a farmer has been compensated. Field assessments must be completed, losses documented and claims processed. Delays can leave households struggling long after relief has been announced.
In October, the government announced an initial payment of ₹5,000 per farmer, with detailed crop-loss compensation to be decided after assessments. For a farmer who has lost a season's income, this may offer some immediate help, but it cannot replace a transparent assessment of actual losses and adequate compensation. The political value of announcing relief is immediate. The administrative task of delivering it fairly is harder and far less visible.
Drought can also temporarily unite political rivals. When constituencies across party lines face water shortages and crop failure, leaders have a common reason to demand help from the government. But this unity may postpone deeper confrontations. Questions about leadership, alliances and power-sharing can become less urgent when relief dominates the agenda.
This does not mean leaders welcome drought or that relief decisions are made to protect their positions. Such claims would need evidence. The more defensible point is that a crisis changes political incentives. It gives leaders a common issue to mobilise around, while letting them demonstrate influence by securing benefits for their constituencies. The danger is that immediate calculations overshadow long-term questions about water management, agricultural policy and rural resilience. Maharashtra has faced repeated droughts, which raises a larger question: why do so many rural communities remain so vulnerable when the rains fail?
Durable Response
The answer lies beyond politics. Climate variability, uneven rainfall, groundwater stress, crop choices and regional differences in irrigation all contribute. Marathwada and parts of Vidarbha can suffer severe water stress even when other regions receive more rain. A durable response must therefore go beyond declarations and emergency payments.
Drought assessment should use granular data at the village or revenue-circle level wherever feasible, so that local crop failures are not hidden by taluka-wide averages. Relief must also arrive on time; crop-loss surveys, compensation decisions and tanker deployment cannot become exercises in bureaucratic delay. The government must invest in watershed development, groundwater recharge, efficient irrigation and the restoration of local water bodies. Check dams can help in suitable locations, but they must be planned according to hydrology, not political convenience. Finally, agricultural policy must encourage crops suited to local water availability and strengthen employment outside farming. The lesson of 1972 still holds: when crops fail, people need reliable ways to earn and to obtain food.
Maharashtra's drought is testing more than its water resources. It is testing the fairness of its institutions and the priorities of its leadership. The state learned important lessons from 1972: employment guarantees, food distribution and relief programmes can prevent crop failure from becoming a humanitarian catastrophe. But these protections work only when they reach those who need them, regardless of constituency or party.
The controversy over drought declarations shows the danger of letting relief become a contest of influence. The answer is not to deny assistance where it is deserved, but to make the criteria transparent, the assessments credible and the delivery accountable.
The uncomfortable question is: why does a crisis suit everyone? The answer is not that drought benefits every politician materially. It is that emergencies create opportunities to display power, claim credit, mobilise supporters and demand a larger share of public resources. Farmers, meanwhile, cannot treat drought as a political game. Their crops, incomes, livestock and access to water are at stake. A drought should be measured by the suffering it causes and the lives the state protects, not by the political influence needed to secure relief.
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Mohd Ziyaullah Khan is a freelance content writer and editor based in Nagpur. He is also an activist and social entrepreneur, and co-founder of TruthScape, a team of digital activists fighting disinformation on social media
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