Is the liquor mafia strong, or is the Madhya Pradesh state machinery weak?

By Raj Kumar Sinha* 

The deaths caused by poisonous and adulterated liquor in six villages of Bunda tehsil in Madhya Pradesh’s Sagar district have once again brought the state’s excise system, police administration and allegations of political protection into sharp focus. Residents of Ghughra Khurd, Nauraaj, Bamura, Patan, Chauka and Dalpatpur fell ill after consuming poisonous liquor, and a series of deaths followed. As of the morning of September 7, the administration had confirmed 12 deaths, while local reports put the toll as high as 19. This discrepancy itself should be investigated. Around 30 people are reportedly still under medical observation.

The preliminary investigation has reportedly linked the supply of the liquor to the Lalitpur region of Uttar Pradesh. Police have named 30 people as accused and arrested 14, while several officials from the excise and police departments have been suspended. But these actions, though necessary, do not answer the most important questions.

A few days before the tragedy, a daily newspaper had reported a case involving suspected counterfeit liquor packaging. Yet, reportedly without a forensic examination, the product was given a clean chit on Saturday. Just a day later, poisonous liquor claimed lives. This raises a fundamental question: under whose pressure was the liquor cleared by the police and excise authorities without a forensic examination? The issue is not merely who manufactured or sold the poisonous liquor. The bigger question is how such liquor reached these villages in the first place, apparently under the watch of the administration.

The Sagar tragedy is not Madhya Pradesh’s first poisonous-liquor disaster. It appears to be the latest episode in a recurring pattern. Each time, there are arrests, suspensions, compensation announcements and orders for investigations. Then, gradually, public attention fades and the system moves on. The numbers demonstrate how old and serious the problem is.

According to NCRB data provided by the Union government in Parliament, Madhya Pradesh recorded 410 deaths from the consumption of illicit or adulterated liquor in 2018, 190 in 2019 and 214 in 2020—814 deaths in just three years. In 2021, the NCRB recorded another 108 such deaths in the state. These figures should not be interpreted as the total number of alcohol-related deaths, since the NCRB category specifically covers deaths attributed to illicit or adulterated liquor. Even with that limitation, the figures demonstrate that poisonous liquor in Madhya Pradesh is neither a new nor an accidental problem. It points to a long-standing illegal trade that has repeatedly escaped effective prevention.

Government records of the Madhya Pradesh Legislative Assembly show that 24 people died in the January 2021 Morena illicit-liquor tragedy. A court subsequently convicted 14 accused and sentenced them to 10 years of rigorous imprisonment. But the story did not end in Morena. In January 2022, four people died after consuming illicit liquor in Bhind. At the time, then Chief Minister Shivraj Singh Chouhan himself said that the supply of illicit liquor could not take place without the involvement of local police.

That statement should not be forgotten merely as a reaction to one particular incident. Today, the same question has returned in Sagar. Why does the administration act after deaths, rather than before them?

Illegal liquor is rarely an invisible activity. In villages and small towns, the local police and excise machinery are generally in a position to know who is selling liquor, where it is coming from and through which routes it is being transported. Yet action often begins only after several families have already lost loved ones.

In the Sagar case, reports indicate that the counterfeit packaging allegedly looked similar to genuine liquor and that investigators suspect a supply connection with Lalitpur. Reports have also emerged that five liquor shops were sealed. If these reports are accurate, the problem may extend far beyond an individual village-level seller. If liquor was being brought from outside the state, distributed locally and sold to people who believed they were purchasing legitimate liquor, then the question is not simply about one seller. It is about the entire supply chain and the failure to monitor it.

Allegations of a nexus between the liquor mafia and political power are now being raised in the context of the Sagar tragedy. Such allegations must be treated seriously, but they should not be presented as established facts unless supported by evidence. At the same time, dismissing them outright would also be premature. An illicit liquor network cannot ordinarily operate for a long period on the strength of criminals alone. Where illegal trade continues systematically, the possibility of local protection, administrative negligence, corruption or political influence deserves an impartial investigation.

Therefore, the Sagar investigation must go beyond the people who manufactured or sold the liquor. It must establish who brought the liquor into the area, who distributed it locally, who supplied or produced the counterfeit packaging, and who made it appear to be legitimate liquor. It must determine whether complaints had previously reached the police or excise authorities, who received them, what action was taken and, crucially, who failed to act. It must also examine whether any official, political figure or influential person provided protection to the network.

Suspending a few officials after every poisonous-liquor tragedy is an easy administrative response. Officials from the excise and police departments have reportedly been suspended in the Sagar case as well. But suspension alone does not reform a system. The investigation must determine exactly what responsibility each official had and what he or she failed to do. If an official deliberately ignored illegal activity, failed to act despite receiving credible information or provided protection to a liquor operator, then responsibility should not end with departmental action. Where evidence supports it, criminal liability must also be established.

Similarly, arresting a small liquor seller and declaring that the entire network has been dismantled cannot be considered a permanent solution. The people at the top of the supply chain, and those who may have enabled the network, must also be identified.

The government has an excise department, police force, intelligence machinery, border-checking mechanisms and a system for monitoring licensed liquor shops. If poisonous liquor can nevertheless reach villages and cause mass deaths, the question is ultimately about the effectiveness of this entire system. The greatest failure is that the government often responds after the tragedy rather than preventing it before the tragedy.

There is also a serious public-health dimension. Methanol poisoning can cause symptoms such as blurred vision and can become fatal without timely treatment. Reports from Sagar indicate that some patients complained of blurred vision. This underlines the need for a rapid-response mechanism involving the health, police and excise departments in every district. Medical facilities must be equipped to recognise suspected toxic-alcohol poisoning quickly, while authorities should have mechanisms to immediately identify and trace the source of suspected liquor.

The Sagar investigation should therefore trace the entire supply chain, audit complaints about illicit liquor received over recent months, examine the action taken by police and excise officials, investigate the financial dealings of suspected suppliers and intermediaries where legally warranted, and independently examine the role of officials. Allegations of political protection must also be investigated. If evidence establishes the involvement of any elected representative, political figure or influential person, action should be taken against that person with the same determination applied to a small liquor seller.

The Sagar deaths should not become another statistic followed by another cycle of arrests, suspensions, compensation and silence. The real test of governance is not how quickly the administration responds after people die. It is whether the system is capable of preventing such deaths in the first place.

The central question, therefore, remains as stark as it is uncomfortable: Is the liquor mafia becoming stronger—or is the state machinery becoming weaker?

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*With Bargi Dam Displaced and Affected Persons Association