Direct benefit transfers and electoral politics: Lessons from West Bengal

By Harasankar Adhikari 

‘Laxmi Bhandar’ is a flagship direct cash transfer scheme for women from economically weaker communities in West Bengal. It was introduced by the All India Trinamool Congress government led by Mamata Banerjee after returning to power for a third consecutive term in 2021. The scheme provides a fixed monthly financial assistance to eligible women beneficiaries and has since become a prominent feature of the state’s welfare architecture.

Over time, similar initiatives have been adopted in other states, including the Mukhyamantri Mahila Samman Yojana in Delhi and the Mukhyamantri Ladli Behna Yojana in Madhya Pradesh. Direct Benefit Transfer (DBT)-based schemes targeting women voters have increasingly become central to electoral manifestos across party lines. Even the Bharatiya Janata Party, a major political rival of the Trinamool Congress in West Bengal, has proposed comparable measures. While these schemes are presented as instruments of women’s empowerment, an important question remains: has ‘Laxmi Bhandar’ meaningfully advanced women’s empowerment in West Bengal after nearly five years of implementation?

To examine this issue empirically, I conducted a survey among beneficiaries of the ‘Laxmi Bhandar’ scheme. A purposive sample of 100 women was selected, maintaining an equal rural–urban ratio (1:1). Fifty women aged 25–50 years were selected from South 24 Parganas district, adjacent to South Kolkata, and another 50 women of the same age group were chosen from South Kolkata.

The data revealed that 60% of the respondents belonged to the Above Poverty Line (APL) category and were relatively financially stable, largely due to the earnings of their spouses or counterparts. Among these counterparts, 25% were state government employees, 35% worked in private companies (including gig workers), 22% were engaged in small or medium businesses, and the remaining were skilled workers such as electricians and plumbers. Seventy-five percent of these women themselves were employed, mostly in the informal sector, earning between Rs. 8,000 and Rs. 10,000 per month. All reported living in their own houses, including 1–2 BHK flats in urban areas.

Among respondents classified under the Below Poverty Line (BPL) category, 78% worked as domestic help or in other low-income occupations, while their spouses were mostly daily wage labourers. However, even within this group, all reported residing in concrete houses. The sample also indicated that 70% of respondents belonged to the general category, with the remaining belonging to Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Other Backward Classes (OBCs).

Through interviews and interactions, I found that some respondents acknowledged receiving assistance in enrolling for the scheme through local political intermediaries. Several admitted that they participated in political activities when mobilised and generally voted for the ruling party. Sixty percent of the respondents stated that they used the money for personal expenses, while 15% reported that it helped them manage financial crises. Notably, some women from BPL households revealed that a portion—approximately 25%—of the transferred amount was informally appropriated by male family members for personal consumption, including alcohol.

The findings suggest that while ‘Laxmi Bhandar’ provides supplementary income and limited financial relief, its impact on substantive empowerment—such as enhancing women’s autonomy, decision-making power, or long-term economic independence—appears constrained. Concerns were also raised regarding the fairness and transparency of beneficiary selection.

These observations raise broader questions about the role of cash-transfer schemes in electoral politics. Are such initiatives strengthening social security frameworks, or are they reinforcing a model of welfare that prioritises short-term electoral gains over structural transformation? The long-term implications for democratic accountability and public finance merit serious debate.