An American professor of Medieval English literature, Grover Furr’s new book, The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact Explained: The Soviet Struggle for an Anti-Nazi Alliance, offers a comprehensive reinterpretation of the diplomatic maneuvers leading up to the outbreak of the Second World War. The central thesis of the book is a direct rebuttal of the prevailing Western historical narrative regarding the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact of August 1939. Furr, who is known for his revisionist works on Soviet history, argues that the Soviet Union unwaveringly sought a collective security agreement with Britain and France to contain Nazi Germany. According to Furr, the failure to form this anti-Hitler coalition was not the fault of the USSR, but rather the result of deliberate obstruction by Western powers who viewed communism as a greater threat than fascism.
The book is structured around an analysis of diplomatic records and secondary sources, which Furr uses to challenge the traditional view that the Soviet Union allied with Hitler to partition Eastern Europe. Instead, Furr posits that the Western ruling circles—specifically in the United Kingdom, France, and Poland—foresaw socialist revolution as a more immediate danger than Nazi aggression. He asserts that their policy of appeasement effectively granted Germany a license for expansion eastward, serving as a breeding ground for the eventual invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941. The author contends that Western leaders feared revolution by their own working classes far more than they feared German subjugation of Europe, thereby encouraging Hitler to direct his aggression against the East.
A significant portion of the text is dedicated to the role of Poland, which Furr argues was sacrificed by its Western allies to provide Hitler with a border from which to attack the USSR. Furr directly addresses the contentious issue of the Soviet invasion of Poland in September 1939, a charge he categorically denies. Citing the analysis of Bill Bland, among others, Furr argues that the Red Army’s entry into Poland was not an act of aggression or partition, but a defensive measure. He explains that the demarcation line established in the Pact was intended to define the limits of Soviet interest. If the Polish army were defeated, this line would allow the Polish government to retreat and seek shelter, creating a buffer state hostile to Germany between the Reich and the Soviet frontier. Furr emphasizes that the Soviet motivation was strategic defense rather than any ideological affinity for fascist Poland or territorial expansion.
The book also critiques the anti-communist propaganda that has historically bracketed the Soviet Union with Nazi Germany. Furr argues that this narrative obscures the negative role played by Western powers in the acute failure to forge an effective anti-Hitler alliance. He characterizes the Western betrayal of the era as one that was only repealed at the gates of Moscow by the Red Army. The volume includes a foreword by Professor Domenico Losurdo, the late Italian philosopher, and endorsements from scholars such as Professor David Laibman, who praises Furr's use of archival sources.
The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact Explained is a work of historical revisionism that seeks to vindicate Soviet diplomacy. The author's arguments are supported by references to specific historical documents and the writings of other revisionist historians. While the book presents a compelling, if controversial, argument regarding the strategic necessities faced by the Soviet Union in 1939, it is important to note that Furr’s conclusions are situated within a specific historiographical tradition that often contrasts sharply with mainstream academic consensus. Furr writes with what his endorsers describe as a "familiar ease" with Russian and Russian Archive sources, aiming to provide a critical contribution to the understanding of European history.
Ultimately, the text serves as a robust defense of the Soviet decision-making process. It challenges readers to reconsider the conventional wisdom regarding the origins of World War II, arguing that the Soviet Union was the only power genuinely committed to a collective security agreement against Nazi Germany. The book is a significant contribution to the ongoing debate about the complex diplomatic realities of 1939 and the responsibility for the outbreak of the war. It is a dense, argument-driven work that will appeal to those interested in alternative perspectives on Soviet history and the origins of the Second World War.
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*Freelance journalist
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