Carl von Clausewitz remains one of history’s most original military thinkers. His writings extend beyond particular conflicts and elevate the study of warfare to a broader theoretical level. By examining the relationship between war and politics, the interaction between governments, military leadership, and society, and the dynamics that drive escalation, he created a body of work that has continued to shape discussions of strategy since the 19th century.
Interestingly, his ideas found their most attentive readers not only among professional military officers but also among those engaged in movements of popular resistance and unconventional warfare. While his influence on Lenin has been widely discussed, the connections to Engels, Mao, Giáp, and others are less well known. The first French edition of Clausewitz and the People’s War explored these links and examined revolutionary warfare through new perspectives.
The recent republication of Clausewitz and the People’s War and Other Politico-Military Essays by Foreign Languages Press, two decades after its original appearance, seeks to renew this discussion. This revised and expanded edition includes dedicated chapters on leaders such as Mao and Giáp, drawing on newly available sources such as Giáp’s memoirs and Mao’s reading notes.
The author, T. Derbent, has long studied the adaptation of Clausewitz’s ideas in modern contexts and has produced extensive research on how they intersected with various political and military traditions. His work traces both the intellectual relationship between Clausewitz and later theorists and the ways in which specific military doctrines drew on or diverged from Clausewitzian principles.
The book situates Clausewitz alongside a range of figures, including Engels, Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin, Mao, and Che Guevara, and examines how elements of their military concepts were informed by his ideas. It includes essays such as Lenin and the War, Towards a Proletarian Military Doctrine, and reflections on Marighella, as well as a detailed glossary and historical charts designed to make the material more accessible. The approach combines historical documentation with analysis, giving readers tools to compare different strategies across movements and periods.
Derbent emphasizes that Engels was the first to seriously engage with Clausewitz’s theories within a broader political framework, while Lenin’s interpretation of On War brought new clarity to the political character of warfare. Trotsky remained sceptical of any rigid doctrine, while Stalin’s rejection of Clausewitz after the Second World War contrasted with the continued application of his principles by Soviet generals.
Mao’s formulation of protracted people’s war drew on Clausewitz as well as Chinese traditions, and Giáp in Vietnam applied similar principles in anti-colonial struggles. Later movements in Peru and Nepal also reflected this lineage, even while adapting it to their own circumstances.
The collection concludes with reflections on later movements, including the Red Brigades, noting both continuities and divergences from Clausewitzian strategy. By tracing these debates, Derbent’s work provides readers with a broad framework to evaluate how theories of war have been understood, reinterpreted, or contested in different contexts.
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*Freelance journalist
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