When US President Donald Trump, following his assumption of the presidency for the second time in the Oval Office, began tightening trade screws against China, he quickly started to back down more than expected in the face of Chinese retaliation, given Beijing’s economic resilience, reserves of rare earths and magnets, and its control over key supply chains. The administration now appears to be softening its stance on China regarding Taiwan and, more broadly, the Indo-Pacific theatre, while moving ahead with trade talks with China.
It has not escaped Beijing’s notice that the Trump administration, during both its previous tenure and its predecessors, pursued clear strategies of geopolitical containment of China. On the other side, India was caught off guard when the Trump administration imposed a 50 percent tariff on almost all goods exported by India.
In this larger context, China would like to invest in normalizing political tensions and strengthening trade ties with India to weaken the American containment strategy by hamstringing the QUAD in the Indo-Pacific and cultivating India’s support for its “One China” policy, with an open declaration of Taiwan as part of China undercutting American long-term geopolitical strategies in the region.
The much-celebrated friendship between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Trump, and the good wishes Modi extended to Trump during the presidential elections last year, appeared to be more a flamboyant display of personal equations than a reflection of genuine bilateral warmth.
The imposition of tariffs directed at unsettling the Indian economy exposed the hollowness of Indo-US ties. Strategic relations that had taken years of strenuous effort from both sides were suddenly overturned. The rupture in relations has been reinforced by Indian opposition parties, the media, and the public, who expect the Modi government not to yield in the face of Trump’s threats.
India and China themselves faced major turbulence in their bilateral relations in 2020 following a fierce confrontation in the Galwan Valley of the Himalayas, which led to the loss of many soldiers on both sides and a prolonged standoff lasting four years.
However, in October last year, both countries emerged from frozen relations by reaching an agreement on patrolling a stretch of their long-disputed border. This thaw allowed Prime Minister Modi to meet and hold talks with President Xi Jinping in Russia that same month on the sidelines of the BRICS Summit. On August 31 this year, both leaders are expected to meet again during the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Summit in China, though in a changed context of greater desperation and expectations from India, which China is likely to leverage. If reciprocity can cement these ties, it could herald a new Asian Century.
During his visit to India on August 18–19, 2025, to hold the 24th round of Special Representatives’ talks on the boundary question, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi referred to the continuing US threat, speaking of “unilateral bullying” and the danger it posed to free trade and international order. His remarks were seen as preparing the ground for the upcoming Modi–Xi meeting during the SCO Summit.
Perceptual divergences on geopolitical issues have often pushed both countries into irreconcilable positions. India has been unwilling to facilitate China’s membership in the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, while China has been reluctant to strengthen the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar initiative.
Though both sides frequently invoked ideas such as “China-India Plus One” or “China-India Plus X” cooperation for mutual benefits, little substantive progress was achieved. India and China have consistently failed to share common perceptions of threats, geopolitical objectives, and regional integration. The adversarial history of their relations has left a lasting imprint on Indian threat perception, with the 1962 war widely viewed within India as a betrayal of the Panchsheel Agreement of 1954. The Doklam and Galwan standoffs further underscored the continuing trust deficit and raised questions about how the two could reconcile their positions in “overlapping peripheries.”
Beijing’s refusal to recognize the McMahon Line as the international border and its assertion of sovereignty over Arunachal Pradesh have shaped Indian perceptions of China. China’s growing arms supplies to India’s neighbors have reinforced the belief that Beijing is steadily expanding its influence in what India regards as its strategic periphery. On the other hand, Chinese perceptions of India have been shaped by the unresolved border dispute and India’s granting of asylum to the Dalai Lama, who has called for autonomy for Tibet.
In June 2024, India approved a U.S. congressional delegation’s meeting with the Dalai Lama. Similarly, while China seeks to isolate Taiwan, India has moved closer to Taipei by signing agreements for joint semiconductor manufacturing and a labor-mobility arrangement in February 2024. India has also delivered BrahMos missiles to the Philippines despite China’s maritime dispute with Manila in the South China Sea. New Delhi’s commitment to a strategic partnership with the US on one hand, while seeking ties with China on the other, has not convinced Beijing that India’s moves are not aimed at curbing Chinese influence. Conversely, Beijing’s assertive economic policies in South Asia and the Indian Ocean have strengthened suspicions within India’s strategic community, pushing it further into Washington’s sphere of influence.
Despite these tensions, the two neighbors have at times managed to cooperate in the face of external threats. Yet, their respective equations with external powers have often bred suspicions, resulting in a relationship that remains fleeting and inconsistent. Both demonstrated their ability to cooperate in the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, with India becoming the second-largest investor after China and receiving $4.4 billion by 2018 to fund projects in power, transportation, and urban development.
They have also worked together within BRICS, the SCO, and the G20, using South-South cooperation as a platform to press for a more egalitarian global economic order. Both countries have taken similar stances on climate issues and collaborated on securing energy supplies, while the prolonged US-China trade war opened some space for cooperation in trade.
China’s conflicting relations with India have often been shaped by New Delhi’s close ties with Washington, and its ambiguous stance on China-US disputes involving Taiwan and the South China Sea. However, in the changed context following massive American tariffs on India, New Delhi may find room to strengthen ties with Beijing without pandering to American concerns.
At the same time, China could ease India’s security anxieties by opening more avenues for bilateral dialogue in this evolving strategic environment.
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*Lecturer in Political Science, SVM Autonomous College, Jagatsinghpur, Odisha
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