Indo-US relations, which had grown steadily since the end of the Cold War and encompassed not only massive trade but also strategic cooperation in military interoperability and the sharing of critical and emerging technologies without major hiccups, have now been put in reverse gear by US President Donald Trump. His decision to impose 50 percent tariffs on Indian exports of goods, effective from August 27, came as an unexpected move that turned long-held assumptions of US foreign policy upside down. This has created a quandary for Indian foreign policy makers and strategic experts, who had long believed that India’s geopolitical centrality made it indispensable to the US in containing China’s growing influence in the Indo-Pacific and beyond.
President Trump has also courted Pakistan, highlighting the possibilities of bilateral financial gains, much to the dissatisfaction of Indian strategists. Some commentators believe he is favoring Pakistan because it openly acknowledged the US role in easing the Indo-Pak military standoff in May and even suggested Trump’s name for the Nobel Peace Prize. To many in India, such a hardened US approach is surprising, given that successive American administrations, including Trump’s own first term, celebrated the “natural bond” between the two democracies and consistently underlined India’s geopolitical significance in the Indo-Pacific. Moreover, India’s huge market size, as the most populous country in the world, had given it confidence that it would not face economic alienation from champions of free markets like the US.
India’s policy of multi-alignment has, however, failed to deliver the intended results. Conceived as the best way to maneuver among great powers in the post-Cold War era, it aimed to serve national interests without entering into formal alliances. After the Soviet Union’s collapse made non-alignment less relevant, India adopted multi-alignment to build partnerships across the ideological spectrum while preserving strategic autonomy. The goal was to maintain balanced ties with the US, Russia, and China—not to pit them against one another but to avoid dominance and hegemony in South Asia and the Indo-Pacific while advancing India’s developmental interests.
In this context, India forged close strategic ties with the US to counterbalance China, while ensuring that relations with Beijing did not deteriorate to the point of inviting excessive American intervention. India was willing to align more closely with Washington if China crossed red lines or pursued outright regional domination, and would have adopted a similar stance against Russia had it posed such threats. For years, successive US administrations tolerated these nuances and still considered India a credible partner in countering China.
Trump, however, has declared great power rivalries to be obsolete. He seeks instead a major trade deal with China, which he views as far more significant than India because of its reserves of rare-earth minerals, technological prowess, economic size, and control over global supply chains. Simultaneously, while punishing India with tariffs for purchasing Russian oil, Trump has positioned himself as a potential broker in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, dealing directly with President Vladimir Putin. By abandoning the framework of great power competition, Trump has undermined India’s strategy of multi-alignment and, in turn, strengthened China’s position in South Asia and the Indo-Pacific.
For India, the only option left is to reinforce and diversify its multi-alignment strategy. This will likely mean not only maintaining ties with Russia and China but also deepening military and security partnerships with Japan, Australia, Britain, South Korea, and the European Union, along with strengthening cooperation within the Global South. At the same time, India must focus on becoming a more self-reliant economy to reduce vulnerability to the mercurial policies of the Trump administration and the uncertainties of great power rivalry. Yet Trump’s conceptual dismissal of great power competition does not change the reality on the ground. If China becomes further emboldened by the weakening of US partners such as India and Japan, both Washington and New Delhi will face even greater challenges.
Moreover, by imposing steep tariffs on India and other countries, the Trump administration ignored the fact that low-income Americans spend a large share of their income on imported goods, while industries employing manual workers depend on imported inputs. Farmers and cattlemen are also highly vulnerable to retaliatory tariffs. Trump’s administration had already signaled disregard for India’s relevance to US strategic planning when, earlier this year, it sent back Indian immigrants on grounds of overstaying visas, without exploring a diplomatic solution. The reality remains that it is technology, rather than trade or migration, that has fueled job losses in the US.
By alienating India—a credible trade and security partner with the world’s largest market—in favor of closer ties with revisionist powers that carry an anti-Western legacy, the Trump administration risks undermining long-term American interests. While technological advantages may currently sway Trump’s outlook, it is not far-fetched to expect that Artificial Intelligence will soon displace even skilled American workers, intensifying the very challenges he seeks to avoid.
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*Senior Lecturer in Political Science, SVM Autonomous College, Jagatsinghpur, Odisha
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