The latest resolution of the Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly calling for the restoration of full statehood raises an important political question that goes beyond the issue of statehood itself: what place do Article 370, Article 35A and the National Conference's long-standing demand for greater autonomy occupy in its present political programme?
The demand for restoration of statehood is, in itself, a legitimate political position. Jammu and Kashmir was a state before August 5, 2019, and the restoration of that status remains an important issue in the region's politics. But statehood and the constitutional position that existed before August 5, 2019, are not the same thing. Restoration of statehood would not, by itself, restore Article 370 or Article 35A, nor would it necessarily recreate the constitutional and political arrangements that existed before 2019.
That distinction matters because the National Conference's 2024 election manifesto went considerably beyond statehood. It called for the restoration of Article 370 and Article 35A, the restoration of statehood, and implementation of the 2000 Autonomy Resolution. Those commitments formed part of the political programme on which the party sought a mandate.
The subsequent emphasis on statehood therefore raises a legitimate question about political consistency. If the party's present priority is the restoration of statehood, what is its current position on Article 370 and Article 35A? Have those demands been postponed, abandoned, or merely placed lower on the political agenda? If the strategy has changed, voters are entitled to know why.
There is also a constitutional and political question surrounding the assumption that statehood is achievable while restoration of the pre-August 5 constitutional position is not. Both the status of the state and the constitutional framework associated with Article 370 were altered in 2019, although through different legal and constitutional measures. The political feasibility of reversing either or both is ultimately a matter for the Union government, Parliament, the courts where applicable, and the broader constitutional process. It is therefore difficult to treat one demand as inherently realistic and the other as inherently impossible without explaining the political and constitutional basis for that distinction.
This does not mean that the demand for statehood should be dismissed. Rather, it means that statehood should be discussed accurately and not presented as equivalent to restoration of everything that changed in 2019.
The question becomes even more significant when the National Conference's historical position on autonomy is considered. The 2000 Autonomy Resolution remains an important part of the party's political history, and references to that resolution continue to appear in its political discourse. The question of autonomy, however, is different from the question of statehood. Statehood concerns the constitutional status of Jammu and Kashmir within the Union, whereas autonomy raises broader questions about the distribution of legislative, executive and constitutional powers between Jammu and Kashmir and the Union.
The history of the Autonomy Resolution also deserves to be discussed in its entirety. In 2000, the Jammu and Kashmir Assembly adopted the resolution concerning greater autonomy. Farooq Abdullah subsequently raised the issue with the then central government led by Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee. The Union government did not accept the resolution.
There have been different political interpretations of what followed. Critics of the National Conference have argued that the party did not pursue the autonomy demand with the same determination after its rejection. Supporters of the party have offered different explanations for its political choices at the time. Whatever interpretation one adopts, the episode remains relevant when contemporary political parties invoke their historical positions on autonomy and accuse others of compromising Jammu and Kashmir's political interests.
The same principle applies to the discussion about the Bharatiya Janata Party's political presence in Jammu and Kashmir. It is sometimes argued in contemporary political debate that the People's Democratic Party brought the BJP into mainstream politics in Jammu and Kashmir through their alliance formed in 2015. That alliance was certainly a major political development. However, the BJP had already secured eight seats in the 1996 Jammu and Kashmir Assembly elections. Its political presence in the region therefore predates the PDP-BJP coalition by many years.
Historical context matters because political arguments can become misleading when only selected parts of the past are recalled. If the discussion is about political compromises, the BJP's emergence in Jammu and Kashmir, or the alleged betrayal of Kashmir's political interests, the complete chronology should be acknowledged.
The PDP has continued to place Article 370 within the broader political debate. Mehbooba Mufti has argued that the question of statehood should not be separated from the larger constitutional changes made in 2019. Waheed Para has also sought to raise questions concerning Article 370 and Article 35A in the Assembly, although such efforts have not necessarily secured the support required to become the position of the House. Sajad Lone has similarly maintained that the political issues arising from August 5, 2019, should remain part of the broader political discussion.
These competing positions demonstrate that statehood is not the only political question before Jammu and Kashmir. Different parties and leaders have different views about what should constitute the region's political agenda, and those differences deserve to be debated openly.
The latest Assembly resolution again places restoration of full statehood at the centre of the immediate demand while referring to the earlier Autonomy Resolution and the Assembly's November 2024 resolution. That combination makes it reasonable to ask how the National Conference now defines its broader constitutional objectives.
What, specifically, is the party's current position on Article 370? What is its position on Article 35A? Does it continue to support the 2000 Autonomy Resolution as a political objective, or does it regard statehood as the principal achievable goal at this stage? If these positions have changed since the 2024 manifesto, what circumstances led to the change?
These are not unreasonable questions for a governing political party. Election manifestos are political commitments, and voters have a legitimate interest in understanding how those commitments evolve once a party assumes office.
There is also a practical dimension to the debate. An elected government can pass resolutions and articulate political demands, but the extent of its constitutional authority depends on the existing constitutional framework. Jammu and Kashmir's present status as a Union Territory means that important powers and decisions remain outside the exclusive control of the elected government. Political promises should therefore be assessed not only by what they demand but also by what the government making those demands has the legal and constitutional capacity to implement.
The central issue, consequently, is not whether statehood matters. It clearly does. Nor is the question whether the National Conference has the right to pursue statehood. It does.
The more fundamental question is whether the party's present political programme corresponds with the broader commitments on which it sought public support, particularly those concerning Article 370, Article 35A and autonomy.
If the party has changed its priorities because circumstances have changed, that explanation should be made clearly. If the demands remain part of its long-term programme but statehood has been identified as the immediate objective, that too should be stated explicitly. Such clarity would allow voters to distinguish between a change in strategy and a withdrawal of a political commitment.
The word "betrayal" carries a strong political judgment, and whether it accurately describes the National Conference's conduct is ultimately a matter for voters and political observers to determine. What can be stated more objectively is that there is a noticeable difference between a political programme that included restoration of Article 370, Article 35A, statehood and autonomy, and a present political debate in which statehood has become the most prominent immediate demand.
That difference deserves an explanation.
The people of Jammu and Kashmir are entitled to know whether the demand for statehood represents one step toward a broader political objective, a practical prioritisation of achievable goals, or a substantive change in the National Conference's position on the constitutional questions that have defined much of its political history.
The answer to that question will determine how the latest resolution is understood: as part of a continuing political programme, as a change in strategy, or as a narrowing of commitments previously presented to the electorate.
---
Shahrukh Bin Parvaiz is a law student and human rights activist
Comments