India’s elections are contested on the basis of parties, candidates, leaders, local issues, and national narratives. While voters may have diverse reasons for choosing a candidate, the winning representative enters the legislature under the identity of the party on whose ticket the election was fought. A recent analysis by the Association for Democratic Reforms (ADR) and the National Election Watch highlights how frequently this political identity changes post-election.
According to a report published on September 24, 2026, 111 sitting MPs and MLAs changed political parties after winning elections between 2022 and 2026. This figure includes 26 Lok Sabha MPs, seven Rajya Sabha members, and 78 MLAs. The significance of this number extends beyond its size; it raises critical questions about representation, political accountability, and the efficacy of India's anti-defection framework.
The ADR analysis covers elections and by-elections during this period, treating the data not merely as individual defections but encompassing formal mergers, resignations followed by by-election victories, and disqualifications followed by re-elections. The researchers caution that the absence of a single comprehensive official database means the list may not be entirely exhaustive. Of the 111 lawmakers, 78 were MLAs, indicating that state-level politics accounts for roughly seven out of every ten cases. This concentration is particularly striking in specific states. Nagaland recorded the highest number with 32 cases, all involving MLAs and largely reflecting political realignment between the Nationalist Democratic Progressive Party (NDPP) and the Naga People's Front (NPF). West Bengal recorded 20 cases involving Lok Sabha MPs who moved from the All India Trinamool Congress to the Nationalist Citizens Party of India, a move the MPs claim is a merger and which is currently pending before the Lok Sabha Speaker. Other states with notable shifts include Telangana, Goa, Punjab, and Maharashtra, where movements primarily involved MLAs and MPs transitioning between regional and national parties.
The data further reveals that party switching is not evenly distributed across political organizations. The largest number of lawmakers leaving a party came from the NDPP with 25 cases, followed by the AITC with 20, Congress with 19, BRS with nine, and AAP, NCP, and Shiv Sena (UBT) with seven each. On the receiving end, the NPF gained 32 lawmakers, the BJP 29, and the NCPI 20. Together, these three parties accounted for 81 of the 111 cases, representing roughly 73 percent of the dataset. While these figures do not inherently establish the motives behind individual switches—ranging from ideological differences to organizational considerations—the scale of the movement necessitates a broader institutional examination.
A central concern in this context is the impact on the voter’s choice. Electoral decisions are rarely made in a vacuum; party symbols, manifestos, leadership, and local reputations heavily influence voter behavior. Research by Lokniti-CSDS, which has studied voter behavior through extensive national and state-level surveys for decades, underscores the importance of the party label. For instance, a survey conducted around the 2025 Delhi Assembly election found that 57 percent of respondents identified the party as the most important consideration in their voting decision. While not every voter prioritizes the party above all else, a substantial section clearly does. Consequently, a post-election switch alters the political identity under which a representative was elected, bringing the core of the democratic mandate into question.
India’s constitutional framework attempts to address this through the anti-defection law, introduced via the 52nd Constitutional Amendment in 1985, which added the Tenth Schedule. The primary objective was to prevent elected legislators from arbitrarily crossing the floor and undermining elected governments. This was later reinforced by the 91st Amendment, which restricted split-based exceptions while retaining specific conditions for mergers. However, nearly four decades later, defections remain a persistent feature of Indian politics. Academic research suggests the law has yielded complex outcomes. Studies, including a 2024 analysis in the International Journal of Constitutional Law, argue that while restricting floor crossing limits political fragmentation, it simultaneously strengthens centralized party leadership and constrains legislative independence. Furthermore, research in Parliamentary Affairs indicates that such laws significantly impact representative decision-making without necessarily guaranteeing the stability they were designed to ensure. This creates a delicate balance: unrestricted party switching invites political bargaining and instability, whereas excessive party discipline limits a representative's freedom to dissent. Additionally, party switching is not inherently synonymous with wrongdoing. Parties split, alliances shift, and ideological disagreements deepen. When voters subsequently validate a changed affiliation through a by-election, the electorate exercises its choice anew. The controversy primarily arises when representatives change sides without seeking a fresh mandate.
The implications of defection extend beyond constitutional law into economic and political outcomes. A 2023 study in the European Journal of Political Economy estimated that 10 to 30 percent of Indian MLAs could be classified as defectors, depending on the period and definition. The study noted that defectors are two to three times more likely to become government ministers than non-defectors, highlighting how the incentive structure surrounding party switching influences political careers. These findings underscore the need for analytical rigor rather than mere moral judgment when examining defections.
Ultimately, the 111 cases documented by the ADR point to a fundamental question regarding the ownership of an electoral mandate: does it belong to the individual representative, the political party, or the voters? India's Constitution positions elected representatives within political parties and restricts floor-crossing, yet voters remain the ultimate source of electoral legitimacy. A robust democratic system requires a synergy among these elements. Political parties must foster internal democracy, legislators require space for genuine ideological expression, and voters need clarity regarding their electoral choices. When an elected representative fundamentally alters their political allegiance, the public deserves transparency regarding the rationale and the constitutional processes involved. The ADR data serves as a critical indicator, prompting a necessary reflection on democratic accountability. An election's mandate should not conclude when the votes are counted; accountability must endure throughout the representative's term. If political loyalties are permitted to shift after the electorate has made its choice, India's democratic institutions must ensure that the voter is not relegated to a forgotten participant in the ensuing political realignment.
---
Mohd. Ziyaullah Khan is a freelance content writer and editor based in Nagpur. He is also an activist and social entrepreneur, and co-founder of TruthScape, a team of digital activists fighting disinformation on social media
Comments