The revolution had conquered the state, but had it conquered the contradictions of power? This was the question that haunted Mao Zedong in the final decades of his life. It was also the question that distinguished him from many revolutionary leaders who, having overthrown an established order, came to regard the institutions of their own revolution as the final guardians of historical progress. Mao's distinctive proposition was that the Communist Party, notwithstanding its revolutionary origins, could itself become the site of new class contradictions. The party that had liberated the masses could, unless subjected to their continuing supervision, become separated from them.
On 26 December 2021, the 128th anniversary of Mao's birth, thousands gathered in Shaoshan, Hunan, to commemorate the revolutionary who had transformed the destiny of modern China. Zhang Yimou's theatrical production The Memorable Shaoshan Chong recreated Mao's formative years through poetry, revolutionary music, and dramatic performance. Online commemorations attracted extraordinary attention, with the anniversary hashtag recording 120 million views on Sina Weibo at the time of reporting. The Communist Youth League published a poetic tribute celebrating Mao's struggles against formidable enemies and seemingly insurmountable obstacles (Cui, Fandi, and Zhao Yusha. 2021. “Chinese Society Memorize Mao Zedong on 128th Anniversary of His Birth.” Global Times, December 26).
But Mao's historical significance extends far beyond the Long March, the revolutionary victory of 1949, and the establishment of the People's Republic. His contribution to revolutionary theory was to insist that the conquest of political power did not signify the termination of class struggle. The overthrow of the old ruling classes did not automatically eliminate the conditions under which new forms of privilege, bureaucratic domination, and class differentiation could emerge.
For Mao, socialism was not a static institutional arrangement but a historically contradictory process. The existence of a Communist Party, a socialist constitution, and public ownership of the principal means of production could not, by themselves, guarantee that the revolutionary character of society would be preserved. The political content of socialism depended upon the continuing relationship between the masses and those who exercised authority in their name.
Mao's philosophical writings, particularly "On Practice" and "On Contradiction", provided the methodological foundations of this conception. Knowledge arose from social practice, while contradiction remained the driving force of historical development. Socialist society could therefore not be conceived as a realm from which contradictions had disappeared. Rather, its development required their recognition and transformation (Mao, Zedong. 1937a. “On Practice.” In Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, vol. 1. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press; Mao, Zedong. 1937b. “On Contradiction.” In Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, vol. 1. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press).
The mass line gave this philosophical conception its organisational expression. The Communist Party was expected to concentrate the experiences and aspirations of the people into a coherent political understanding and return that understanding to the masses through revolutionary practice. Leadership and popular participation were not separate spheres. They constituted a dialectical relationship in which the party learned from the people while providing political direction (Mao, Zedong. 1943. “Some Questions Concerning Methods of Leadership.” In Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, vol. 3. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press).
Yet an unresolved contradiction remained. If the party represented the organised consciousness of the working class, then who would supervise the party itself? The party could not be both the exclusive judge of its own revolutionary character and the sole authority determining whether it continued to represent the masses. Such a conception would transform revolutionary leadership into an institutional monopoly over political truth.
It was precisely this danger that Mao sought to confront through the theory of continuing revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat. His concern was not simply that capitalism might return through external intervention or the restoration of private ownership. Capitalist tendencies could develop within socialist institutions themselves, particularly where administrative authority, material privilege, and ideological conservatism displaced the revolutionary initiative of workers and peasants.
The Cultural Revolution of 1966–1976 represented Mao's most ambitious and controversial attempt to mobilise society against this possibility. It encouraged party and non-party members, students, workers, and other social groups to challenge established authorities, including leading officials accused of following the capitalist road. The revolutionary leadership itself was thus placed under political scrutiny.
This was an extraordinary historical proposition: the masses were called upon to supervise, criticise, and challenge those who claimed to exercise power on their behalf.
The Cultural Revolution's actual course, however, exposed contradictions within this undertaking. Mass mobilisation did not necessarily produce democratic accountability. Factional struggles, coercion, persecution, and arbitrary political authority frequently undermined the emancipatory objectives proclaimed in its name. The movement generated severe social and institutional disruption, and its historical consequences remain deeply contested.
Indeed, the experience suggests a deeper contradiction: popular supervision cannot remain genuinely independent if the boundaries of permissible criticism are ultimately determined by the same political authority being criticised. Equally, spontaneous mobilisation cannot automatically substitute for durable institutions capable of protecting collective participation against factional coercion.
The theory of continuing revolution also requires distinction from Trotsky's theory of permanent revolution. Trotsky's formulation centred upon the international dynamics of socialist revolution and the relationship between democratic and socialist tasks, particularly in countries undergoing uneven development. Mao's later conception addressed the reproduction of class contradictions within a society where the revolutionary party had already secured state power. The former emphasised the international extension and social development of revolution; the latter concentrated upon the continuing struggle over political authority and class relations within socialist construction (Trotsky, Leon. 1930. "The Permanent Revolution"; Mao, Zedong. 1957. “On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People.” In Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, vol. 5. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press).
The distinction should not be exaggerated into an absolute opposition. Both approaches rejected the conception of revolution as a completed political event. Their theoretical emphases nevertheless differed, and Mao's central innovation lay in identifying the ruling Communist Party itself as a potential location of capitalist restoration.
The subsequent history of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe gives this question particular significance. The disintegration of the socialist states cannot be reduced to a single cause. Economic stagnation, geopolitical pressures, institutional rigidity, nationalism, and declining political legitimacy contributed in different ways to their collapse. Yet the progressive separation of ruling parties from the populations they purported to represent remains an important dimension of the historical explanation.
The Soviet experience thus raises a question closely related to Mao's concerns: can a revolutionary party preserve its legitimacy indefinitely when popular participation becomes subordinate to bureaucratic administration?
China's own development after Mao's death followed a different historical trajectory. The reforms associated with Deng Xiaoping expanded market mechanisms, private enterprise, and international economic integration while preserving the Communist Party's monopoly of political authority. Deng, who had been denounced as a capitalist roader during the Cultural Revolution, subsequently became the central figure in China's reform programme.
Deng's reassessment of Mao was nevertheless more complex than a wholesale rejection. In his 1980 interview with Oriana Fallaci, he defended Mao's foundational historical achievements while acknowledging serious errors in his later leadership (Fallaci, Oriana. 1980. “Interview with Deng Xiaoping.” August 21 and 23). The post-Mao settlement consequently involved both the preservation of Mao's symbolic authority and a decisive departure from important aspects of his political and economic programme.
This created a historical paradox. Mao's revolutionary legitimacy remained central to the political identity of the Chinese state, even as the mechanisms through which socialism was organised underwent substantial transformation.
The paradox has not disappeared under Xi Jinping. On 26 December 2023, the Communist Party of China formally commemorated the 130th anniversary of Mao's birth. In his address, Xi described Mao as a major revolutionary, theorist, and architect of China's socialist development. He reaffirmed the continuing importance of Mao Zedong Thought and placed Mao's historical contribution within the contemporary project of Chinese modernisation (Xi, Jinping. 2023. “Speech at the Symposium Commemorating the 130th Anniversary of Comrade Mao Zedong’s Birth.” December 26. People’s Daily, December 27).
Particularly significant was Xi's insistence upon the continued relevance of the mass line. He emphasised that the party should maintain close relations with the people, draw upon their experience, and accept popular criticism and supervision. These statements indicate that the language of mass participation and supervision has not disappeared from the official conception of socialist governance.
Yet the institutional interpretation has changed. The contemporary Chinese leadership places greater emphasis upon party discipline, organisational cohesion, anti-corruption mechanisms, and internal political supervision than upon the kind of mass upheaval associated with the Cultural Revolution. This distinction should not be confused with an explicit repudiation of Mao's broader philosophical concern. Rather, it raises the question of whether the contradiction Mao identified can be addressed through institutional supervision without reproducing the political consequences of mass revolutionary upheaval.
The Communist Party's 2021 historical resolution provides an important point of reference (Communist Party of China Central Committee. 2021. “Resolution of the CPC Central Committee on the Major Achievements and Historical Experience of the Party over the Past Century.” November 11). It identifies seeking truth from facts, the mass line, and independence as central elements of Mao Zedong Thought, while maintaining the party's critical historical judgment of the Cultural Revolution. The official position therefore combines continuity in revolutionary philosophy with a rejection of the Cultural Revolution as a political method.
The fiftieth anniversary of Mao's death on 9 September 2026 has renewed international discussion of his legacy. Recent assessments emphasise both his enduring place in China's official political identity and the profound suffering associated with the Cultural Revolution. They also note the revival of interest in Mao among some younger Chinese citizens, although the meanings attached to his legacy vary considerably (Reuters. 2026. “Mao, Cultural Revolution Cast Long Shadow over China 50 Years On.” September 9; Li, Jinhan. 2026. “How Mao Zedong’s Legacy Still Shapes China 50 Years On.” Deutsche Welle, September 8).
The continued relevance of Mao therefore cannot be reduced either to official commemoration or to nostalgia. His historical significance resides partly in the unresolved contradiction between revolutionary leadership and the reproduction of political authority.
This contradiction also informs my recent examination of the Gang of Four and Mao's unfinished revolution (Deman, Suresh. 2026. “The Gang of Four and Mao’s Unfinished Revolution: Who Controls the Party?” Unpublished manuscript, Centre for Game Theory & Global Strategy, London. [Provisional title.]). The removal of the Gang of Four in October 1976 marked the defeat of a political grouping associated with the final phase of the Cultural Revolution. Yet the defeat of that grouping did not, by itself, resolve the underlying question of who should supervise the party governing in the name of the masses. Nor did the Gang of Four necessarily provide a satisfactory answer: their own exercise of political authority raised questions about the relationship between revolutionary rhetoric, mass participation, and political accountability.
The fundamental issue is not whether revolutionary leadership should exist. Complex social transformation requires organisation, coordination, and political direction. The issue is whether the authority exercised by revolutionary leadership can remain accountable to the social forces from which it derives its legitimacy.
Mao's historical importance lies in his recognition that the contradiction between leadership and the masses cannot simply be abolished by declaring the party revolutionary. The party's character must be understood through its actual relationship with society, its responsiveness to criticism, and the material interests advanced through its policies.
A socialist revolution that transforms ownership without transforming relations of authority remains vulnerable to bureaucratic domination. Equally, a revolutionary movement that mobilises the masses without protecting their independent political agency risks reproducing domination in a different form.
The problem is consequently not one of choosing between party leadership and popular participation. It is one of understanding their dialectical relationship and the conditions under which that relationship can remain transformative rather than hierarchical.
Mao's life encompassed extraordinary revolutionary achievements and profound historical contradictions. His contribution to China's national liberation and political transformation remains inseparable from the severe consequences of policies pursued under his leadership. A serious historical assessment must acknowledge both dimensions.
But his theoretical challenge survives the controversies of his political career. He recognised that the revolution could confront its most consequential contradictions not only in the struggle against an established ruling class but also within the institutions created by revolutionary victory.
The revolutionary party could not simply inherit the moral authority of the revolution indefinitely. Its claim to represent the working class required continuing examination through the experience and participation of the masses.
Fifty years after Mao's death, this remains a question of enduring importance for political economy and revolutionary theory.
Who supervises the party that claims to govern in the name of the people?
Mao did not leave behind an uncontested institutional solution. He left behind a problem that subsequent revolutionary movements, including those critical of his methods, cannot easily evade.
For the revolution is not the private property of those who lead it. Its emancipatory content must ultimately be judged through the social relations it creates and the capacity of ordinary people to participate in shaping their collective future.
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*Centre for Game Theory & Global Strategy, London
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