The flood crisis in Punjab has deepened, with tens of deaths and nearly two thousand villages submerged. Official data shows that 3.84 lakh people have been affected, with over 21,000 evacuated and crops spread across 1.72 lakh hectares destroyed. While heavy and unprecedented rainfall during the southwest monsoon has been the immediate cause, questions are mounting over the role of major reservoirs—Bhakra on the Sutlej, Pong on the Beas and Ranjit Sagar on the Ravi—in aggravating the situation due to poor operational decisions.
Evidence collected and collated by the advocacy group South Asia Network on Dams, Rivers and People (SANDRP) suggests that the dams were filled too quickly and not managed in a manner that would reduce downstream flood risk. By the end of July, Bhakra was already half full, with operators prioritising storage and limited outflows mainly for power generation. Despite consistent high rainfall in Himachal Pradesh catchment areas flagged by the India Meteorological Department (IMD), spillway gates were not opened until August 19. By then, the dam was already 80 percent full, forcing sudden high releases in late August just as Punjab was reeling under intense rainfall.
Pong dam followed a similar trajectory. By August 18, it was 85 percent full, with authorities delaying major releases despite heavy inflows early in the month. It was only towards the end of August that outflows exceeded one lakh cusecs, contributing to flooding in Punjab and Himachal Pradesh. Inflows into Pong during July–August were the highest since the dam’s commissioning, underscoring the missed opportunity to regulate water levels earlier. The Himachal Pradesh government has already filed a First Information Report against the Bhakra Beas Management Board (BBMB), accusing it of violating dam safety norms. Chief Minister Sukhvinder Singh Sukhu told the state assembly that people in Kangra district’s Fatehpur and Indora areas had been devastated by flooding from sudden releases.
At Ranjit Sagar Dam on the Ravi, delayed action also worsened the crisis. Outflows rose sharply from 9,000 cusecs on August 24 to over 1.7 lakh cusecs on August 27, after water levels crossed the full reservoir mark. This triggered severe flooding, damaged the Madhopur barrage and resulted in at least one death during repair work. Punjab’s irrigation minister admitted that the sudden releases were a result of unexpected inflows and miscalculations, acknowledging that forecasts and upstream rainfall had not been adequately factored into operational decisions.
Power generation patterns at all three dams further underline the shortcomings. Each hydropower station was operating below capacity during July and early August, leading to lower-than-possible outflows and excessive water storage. Output surged only after late August when dams were forced to release water at much higher levels, coinciding with peak floods in Punjab. This not only meant lost economic opportunity but also compounded flood risk.
Experts have warned that the issue goes beyond this year’s disaster. Himanshu Thakkar of the SANDRP said, “Every dam can potentially help moderate floods, but that requires operating them with this objective in mind. When dams are filled up as soon as water is available, they can in fact worsen flood disasters downstream. That is exactly what has happened in Punjab again in 2025, just as in 1978, 1988 and 2023. Unless operations are made transparent, accountable and aligned with flood moderation, such avoidable disasters will keep recurring.”
Thakkar added that while BBMB claims its technical committee reviews flood preparedness, no agendas or minutes of these meetings are in the public domain. “There is urgent need for transparency. Daily data on inflows, outflows, reservoir levels, rule curves, rainfall forecasts and operating decisions must be accessible to the public,” he stressed. He also pointed out that floodwaters this year were heavily silt-laden, increasing damage and indicating wider ecological degradation due to sand mining, road and dam construction, and catchment destruction.
The IMD has reported that North India witnessed its wettest monsoon since 2013, with Himachal Pradesh recording 72 percent above-normal rainfall in August. While climate change is intensifying such events, experts argue that the scale of destruction in Punjab this year was avoidable had dams been operated with foresight and proper coordination. They are calling for an independent review to fix accountability, learn lessons and ensure transparent, responsible dam management. Without such reform, they warn, every new monsoon may bring a bigger disaster than the last.
Comments
Monday, September 08, 2025”
In this regard, I have the observations as under:
(1) Extended Hydrological Predictions and Short-term forecasts of IMD, and the Flood Early Warning Systems provide enough information about the impending flow, which calls for efficient and timely dam operations.
(2) Rule curve of dam needs to be respected, wherein pre-depletion of reservoir is suitably factored in. The reduced reservoir storage on account of reservoir sedimentation calls for desilting of the reservoir, or updating the rule curve.
(3) Integrated Reservoir Operation (IRO) of dams is vital.
(4) The carrying capacity of the river downstream of the dams over the years is restricted due to encroachment. Further, lack of adequate flood protection bunds along the river downstream compound the flooding problem.
(5) Inundation mapping, SoP for emergency action plan etc. should normally be in place and followed to minimize the adverse impacts.