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When ports become pawns: Great-power competition in the Indian Ocean

By Ajay Chaudhary* 
For centuries, the Indian Ocean has been more than a vast expanse of water—it has been the artery of global commerce. Today, it carries more than one-third of the world's bulk cargo and nearly two-thirds of global seaborne oil shipments, making South Asia's ports indispensable to international trade. For the region's littoral states, these maritime gateways have traditionally been viewed as engines of economic growth, regional connectivity, and national development.
Yet the geopolitical landscape surrounding these ports is changing rapidly. As China expands its economic footprint through infrastructure investments across the Indian Ocean, the United States has responded by significantly intensifying its own maritime diplomacy. From Sri Lanka's Port of Colombo to the Maldives' emerging Thilafushi Port, Washington's growing engagement reflects a broader effort to incorporate South Asian maritime infrastructure into its Indo-Pacific strategy.
While the United States presents this engagement as support for regional prosperity and security, many in South Asia view it with greater caution. Rather than being driven solely by developmental objectives, Washington's renewed focus is widely interpreted as part of its strategic competition with China. The danger is that ports designed to facilitate commerce and national development increasingly risk becoming geopolitical instruments in an intensifying contest between major powers.
Maritime Diplomacy Comes to Colombo and Thilafushi
Sri Lanka recently offered a telling example of this evolving approach. In June, Dr. Paul Kapur, the U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs, visited the Port of Colombo alongside Sri Lanka Ports Authority Chairman Dr. Parakrama Dissanayake. Officially, the visit focused on expanding economic cooperation and exploring future investment opportunities.
However, Colombo's strategic importance extends far beyond commercial considerations. As one of the Indian Ocean's premier transshipment hubs, the port occupies a critical position along global shipping routes. Washington's growing diplomatic attention reflects its desire to maintain influence over key maritime infrastructure at a time when China's regional investments have become increasingly significant.
For Sri Lanka, recovering from one of the most severe economic crises in its history, such attention presents both opportunities and challenges. Additional investment and economic partnerships are welcome, but they also bring heightened pressure to navigate the competing strategic interests of external powers without compromising national autonomy.
A similar pattern is emerging in the Maldives. Thilafushi Port, located near Malé, is central to the country's efforts to expand industrial capacity, modernize logistics, and strengthen economic resilience. Yet Washington increasingly views the project through a strategic lens, identifying it as an important node within its broader Indo-Pacific maritime architecture.
The United States argues that its involvement helps preserve a free and open Indo-Pacific by ensuring that no single power dominates vital sea lanes. Nevertheless, when infrastructure projects become closely associated with strategic competition, local development priorities risk being overshadowed by broader geopolitical calculations.
The Cost of Strategic Competition for Small States
For smaller South Asian nations, the growing competition between major powers creates difficult policy dilemmas. Their foremost priorities remain economic development, debt sustainability, climate resilience, and political stability. These objectives do not necessarily align with the strategic imperatives of Washington or Beijing.
When infrastructure decisions become entangled in geopolitical rivalry, governments face increasing pressure to choose sides rather than pursue diversified partnerships. Such zero-sum dynamics can constrain foreign policy flexibility and complicate relationships with multiple development partners. For countries like Sri Lanka and the Maldives, whose economic futures depend on maintaining broad international engagement, preserving strategic autonomy remains essential.
There are also domestic political implications. Foreign-backed infrastructure projects frequently become contentious electoral issues, with rival political parties framing them as symbols of alignment with competing global powers. As a result, projects intended to serve long-term economic needs risk becoming politicized, undermining policy continuity and creating uncertainty for investors and citizens alike.
Preserving Strategic Autonomy
South Asia has long embraced the principle of strategic autonomy, seeking constructive engagement with all major powers rather than exclusive alignment with any one of them. That tradition remains increasingly relevant as global competition intensifies.
If Washington seeks to become a credible long-term partner in the region, its engagement should be guided less by the logic of strategic containment and more by genuine support for locally defined development priorities. Investments in ports, logistics, and connectivity are most valuable when they strengthen national economies rather than advance geopolitical rivalries.
The Indian Ocean should remain a corridor for commerce, cooperation, and shared prosperity—not another chessboard on which great powers compete for influence. Otherwise, the greatest burden of strategic rivalry will continue to fall not on the competing powers themselves, but on the smaller states whose development aspirations become caught between them.
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*Indian American freelance journalist focusing on transregional politics and the shifting dynamics between the U.S. and South Asia

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