Beyond the 'silent relocation' narrative in Bangladesh's Chittagong Hill Tracts

By Dr. Mohammad Asaduzzaman* 

In recent years, a narrative has emerged from the rugged and forested terrain of the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT), portraying the region as the site of a “silent relocation” — a mass forced migration of Bangladesh’s non-Muslim ethnic communities into neighboring India and Myanmar.

However, a closer examination of demographic trends, historical patterns of mobility, kinship structures, and regional security dynamics presents a far more complex picture. What is often described as a crisis of displacement may, in many cases, reflect long-standing cross-border ethnic mobility and localized responses to security concerns rather than a coordinated campaign of exclusion. The movement of people across the region’s porous borders has deep historical roots that predate the creation of modern nation-states.

Bangladesh’s 2022 Population and Housing Census, along with demographic trends observed through 2026, does not indicate a dramatic collapse in the ethnic composition of the CHT. If large-scale ethnic cleansing or systematic expulsion were taking place, a sharp demographic decline among indigenous communities would likely be visible. Instead, the available figures suggest relative demographic continuity.

In districts such as Bandarban and Rangamati, major ethnic groups including the Chakma and Marma communities have maintained stable population shares. The Chakma population in Rangamati, estimated at 42.6 percent of the district population, has shown modest growth between 2020 and 2026. The Marma community continues to maintain a strong presence in Bandarban, accounting for around 17.5 percent of the population. In Khagrachari, the Chakma and Tripura communities together comprise approximately 32.1 percent of residents, with no significant demographic decline reported during the past six years.

The overall population of the CHT remains close to 1.84 million in 2026. The proportion of Buddhists, estimated at 41.7 percent, and Christians, at 3.26 percent, has not experienced any sudden collapse. Their demographic patterns broadly mirror wider national trends. If the region were witnessing the permanent outflow of thousands of minorities, these figures would likely show substantial erosion. Instead, the data suggest that while some families relocate, many others continue to remain in the region, supported in part by state-led infrastructure investments and development initiatives, including projects related to water supply, sanitation, and urban resilience.

A Region Historically Connected Across Borders

Understanding the CHT requires recognition of the fact that the borders separating Bangladesh, India, and Myanmar are relatively recent political constructions imposed upon a historically interconnected highland region. Scholars have often described this broader upland zone as part of “Zomia,” where ethnic identity, kinship, and mobility historically transcended modern state boundaries.

The CHT is culturally and historically linked with the Chin and Rakhine regions of Myanmar and the Mizo-inhabited areas of northeastern India. Communities such as the Bawm, Marma, Mro, Pangkhua, and Lushai share linguistic, cultural, and religious ties with populations across these borders, particularly among Chin and Mizo groups.

As a result, movement between Bandarban, Mizoram, and parts of Myanmar is not always accurately understood through the conventional framework of refugee displacement. In many cases, families travel across borders to stay with relatives, participate in community events, or pursue seasonal economic opportunities within culturally connected regions. Such mobility has existed for generations.

According to UNHCR assessments from March 2026, the overwhelming refugee crisis in the region stems from Myanmar’s ongoing civil war, which has displaced more than 1.6 million people. By contrast, movements from the CHT into India appear comparatively limited. Available estimates place such migration at below 2,500 individuals, many of whom are believed to be involved in temporary or circular migration shaped by kinship networks rather than permanent flight from persecution.

The KCNF Insurgency and Security Operations

International attention in recent years has also focused on operations against the Kuki-Chin National Front (KCNF) and its armed wing, the Kuki-Chin National Army (KCNA). The group has advocated for an autonomous administrative arrangement and has been linked to incidents including armed clashes and bank robberies, prompting counter-insurgency operations by Bangladeshi security forces.

The resulting conflict has contributed to localized and temporary displacement in some areas. Families living near conflict zones have occasionally moved away for safety during military operations and clashes between insurgents and security forces. However, such movements are characteristic of many counter-insurgency environments worldwide and do not necessarily constitute evidence of systematic ethnic persecution.

At the same time, the Bangladeshi government has repeatedly reiterated its commitment to implementing the 1997 Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Accord. In April 2026, Bangladesh informed the United Nations that 65 of the Accord’s 72 provisions had been implemented, while discussions continued regarding unresolved land disputes and the expansion of indigenous representation in government institutions.

Comparing the CHT and Myanmar’s Conflict Zones

Claims that ethnic minorities are seeking safety in Myanmar also raise important questions when viewed against current regional realities. Myanmar’s Chin and Rakhine States remain among the most volatile conflict zones in Southeast Asia. The US Department of State’s Burma Travel Advisory issued on May 8, 2026, advised against all travel to Myanmar due to armed conflict, civil unrest, landmines, arbitrary enforcement of laws, and deteriorating public infrastructure.

Frequent airstrikes by Myanmar’s military junta and intense fighting involving the Arakan Army have made large parts of the country deeply unstable. Against this backdrop, it appears unlikely that large numbers of civilians would voluntarily relocate from comparatively stable areas of the CHT into active war zones on a permanent basis.

Meanwhile, the CHT continues to receive significant public investment in infrastructure and development. Projects funded by institutions such as the Asian Development Bank, including the Chattogram Hill Tracts Inclusive and Resilient Urban Water Supply and Sanitation Project, are aimed at improving living conditions in Rangamati and Bandarban through expanded urban services and climate-resilient infrastructure.

Mobility, Identity, and the Politics of Narrative

The “silent relocation” narrative often overlooks the historical reality that mobility has long been embedded in the social fabric of the region. Many families in the CHT maintain relationships, cultural affiliations, and ancestral ties across borders. Their movement cannot always be reduced to a simple narrative of displacement or expulsion.

Framing the CHT solely as a site of mass exodus risks ignoring demographic evidence, development trends, and the region’s long history of transnational ethnic interconnectedness. The CHT remains a complex and diverse region where questions of governance, security, autonomy, and identity continue to evolve alongside efforts to implement the 1997 Peace Accord.

Cross-border movement in the region is therefore not always evidence of atrocity or forced removal. In many instances, it reflects the enduring fluidity of highland identities and the persistence of social networks that long predate the borders of South Asia’s modern states.

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Professor, Department of Linguistics, University of Dhaka; Director General, International Mother Language Institute